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ABSTRACT 
A government facing an ethnicity based insurgency competing with it for natural 
resources faces different threats based upon the level of ethnic homogeneity of the 
insurgent elements. Where a mono-ethnic insurgent threat develops, the government 
faces a potential separatist movement seeking secession from the country as a means to 
address its grievances. The government will have no option other than counterinsurgency 
to manage this threat. Where a multi-ethnic insurgent threat develops, the threat of 
separatism may be thwarted due to the disparate nature of the insurgent elements and the 
tendency of these groups to compete with each other. In this scenario, the government has 
the ability to “criminalize” the insurgents, thereby enabling the government to justify 
safeguarding its resources while taking minimal steps to resolve the grievances of the 
communities. An examination of the approaches taken by Indonesia and Nigeria in 
addressing their insurgencies in Aceh and the Niger Delta respectively is illustrative of 
the advantages and drawbacks of these approaches. In the end it is shown that 
counterinsurgency is more difficult though decisive, while criminalization ultimately 
risks the creation of a new ethnic identity born of economic hardship, around which an 
ethnic nationalist movement might vie for secession. 
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In order for a state to be viable, one of the main functions that state must perform 
is the controlling of access and distribution of state resources within its borders.1 Access 
to those resources has been the cause of many civil conflicts. When faced with resource 
competition, a state has no choice but to defend those resources lest its viability as a state 
be impacted. Studies have shown that states displaying a high dependency on primary 
commodity exports, low per capita income, and slow economic growth are at high risk of 
rebellion within their borders.2 Furthermore, political, organizational, and financial 
weakness at the level of the state government heightens this risk.3 However, just because 
a state displays these economic factors, does not mean it will automatically have a full-
blown insurgency on its hands. Rebellions need a means to mobilize. Where ethnicity can 
be manipulated as a mobilizing agent, ethnically based insurgencies for control over 
resources can appear. Once this occurs, the state government will face a formidable threat 
within its own borders with which, at some level, it must contend. 
This thesis will compare the differences in how state governments deal with 
ethnicity based insurgencies that contest government control of natural resources when 
the ethnic makeup of those insurgencies are mono as opposed to multi ethnic. The ethnic 
composition of the insurgency may be a factor that enables the insurgent leaders to adopt 
particular strategies in an effort to achieve the goal of greater control of natural resources 
and revenue. Where communities are ethnically homogenous or one ethnic group 
comprises a much higher percentage in those communities than others, the strategy of 
separatism can be pursued as a means to gain control over resources. However in 
                                                 
1 Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 181. 
2 Paul Collier, “The Economic Causes of Civil War and Their Implications for Policy,” in Turbulent 
Peace, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 151. 
3 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” The American 
Political Science Review (February 2001), 3. 
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communities where there is a greater degree of ethnic heterogeneity and those ethnic 
communities compete with one another, the ability to coalesce an effective separatist 
threat may be thwarted. The result of this inability to mount a separatist movement is a 
level of unrest that may be destabilizing, but one that prevents the insurgency from 
constituting a threat to the government’s hold on power in the region where the 
insurgency is taking place.  
The strategies available to these insurgencies will in turn drive the options that the 
government has in seeking a resolution to the problem. Where an effective bid for 
separatism develops, the government has no option but to seek resolution by eliminating 
the insurgent threat through counter-insurgency operations. Failure to do so would 
potentially lead to the total loss of control of the insurgent-controlled territory, to include 
access to the natural resources coming from that region. However, the actions involved in 
prosecuting that counterinsurgency may themselves be damaging. Through government 
actions aimed at marginalizing the insurgent elements, potential exists for the further 
hardening of indigenous ethnic identities and sentiments against the government. This in 
turn may lead to further support for the insurgency. Care must be taken to prosecute a 
nuanced counterinsurgency effort, which includes economic and political concessions 
combined with efforts to destroy the insurgents. Failing to do so can lead to an intractable 
problem born out of the failure to acknowledge the saliency of ethnic homogeneity. 
Governments facing ethnically heterogeneous threats wherein there is a degree of 
ethnic competition between insurgent elements will have the option of simply protecting 
their extractive capabilities in the region while criminalizing the threat. In doing so, the 
government will be able to continue to derive revenue from the extraction of natural 
resources, while avoiding the costly and potentially complicating efforts of 
counterinsurgency aimed at destroying the insurgents. The insurgency is unable to move 
beyond the stage of incipient criminality due to a lack of unified popular support. 
However, this is an approach that cannot be sustained indefinitely. Unless efforts are 
made to address the grievances of the communities that led to the insurgency, ethnic 
boundaries will potentially soften leading to either pan-ethnic cooperation or the creation 
of a new ethnic identity from which an effective separatist movement might be 
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mobilized. Once this occurs, the government will face an ethnically homogenous 
insurgency that must be addressed through counterinsurgency efforts. 
Analysis of the different approaches governments take to addressing mono-ethnic 
and multi-ethnic resource insurgent groups will provide insights into challenges that may 
be faced by the U.S. government while seeking to secure reliable sources of energy, 
particularly fossil fuels, in the future. Understanding the opportunities and constraints 
that the ethnic insurgents face and, more importantly, how state governments address 
them may lead to policy options that enable the U.S. to better support friendly 
governments facing these challenges.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Nature of Ethnicity 
Scholars and theorists identify three main theoretical approaches to ethnicity to 
explain how individuals are groups derive ethnic identity. Those approaches are 
primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. 
Primordialism sees ethnic identity as being given by ancestry and not changeable 
by the individual; the primordial ethnic identity is something that one is born into based 
on language, customs, religion, or race basis. These connections to culture and society are 
ineffable, overwhelming, and coercive.4 Primordialists view conflict as inevitable due to 
“unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of the ethnic groups.”5 Robert 
Kaplan argues that in order to understand the ethnic conflicts between Serbians and 
Croatians, one must go back in history to past events that shaped the ancient hatreds 
between them.6 History matters and leaves indelible impressions on the ethnic 
identification process. 
Instrumentalism acknowledges ethnic markers but states these change over time; 
customs, languages, and religions can be learned and one can pass from one ethnic group 
                                                 
4 Clifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States (Chicago: Free Press, 1963), 109. 
5 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 
International Organization (August 23, 2000), 849. 
6 Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 35. 
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to another. Individuals can choose which ethnic markers they choose to identify with 
based on what advantages they can achieve. Conflict is not viewed as automatic by 
instrumentalists; it is selected based on resource scarcity or strategic efficacy. This is well 
illustrated in Gil Courtemanche’s discussion of changing ethnic identities amongst Hutu 
and Tutsi in Rwanda based upon manipulating marriage lines to deliberately change 
one’s ethnic identity.7 Instrumentalists also argue that group identities are subject to elite 
manipulation. Ethnicity is an “epi-phenomenon” that is artificially created which explains 
why elites are able to manipulate it; differences are accentuated based upon desired 
outcomes by elites. 
Similar to Instrumentalism in many respects, Constructivism also argues that 
ethnic identities are socially constructed and that they are malleable, but that they can be 
created and changed in both a conscious or un-conscious manner.8 The meaning of ethnic 
categories or markers change over time and as such the ethnic labels attached to them 
changes in significance. Ethnic identities are constructed through changes in social and 
economic processes, group discourse, or the actions of individuals whether elite or 
popular.9 However these factors all interact in a highly complex manner that incorporate 
all of the agents of construction at both a conscious and unconscious level. Ethnic 
communities can find themselves “trapped in alleged tradition”10 though the original 
significance of that tradition or other ethnic marker may have changed over time. Of the 
three approaches to ethnicity, constructivism will be most relevant to my analysis. This is 
due primarily to the limitations of the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches. 
2. Ethnic Mobilization 
A number of authors provide meaningful analyses of ethnic mobilization, 
particularly as it relates to resource conflict, building upon the work of previous authors 
                                                 
7 Gil Courtemanche, A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali. (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2003), 28-29. 
8 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 846-847. 
9 Ibid., 851-856. 
10 Jeanne-Pierre Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New York: 
Zone Books, 2003), 15. 
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to provide a rich theoretical framework. The role of inequality is an overarching theme in 
all of the literature on ethnic mobilization.  
Nicolas Sambanis, analyzing the impact of poverty on political violence provides 
important insights into the economic causes of civil war11 Sambanis shows a strong 
correlation between several economic variables and political violence, specifically the 
impact of income per capita, GDP growth, educational opportunity, and income 
inequality on the likelihood of such violence.12 Although he argues that poverty and 
economic opportunity are not the only causes of political violence (specifically 
insurgency), they do appear to have a strong effect on it.13 Sambanis does acknowledge 
however, that economic incentives are not the only explanations for political violence; 
ideology, ethnicity, coercion, and religion can all motivate participation in insurgency.14 
As such, poverty mixed with ethnic cohesion provides a strong recipe for political 
violence. 
Joanne Nagel and Susan Olzak discuss five processes that promote ethnic 
mobilization within states.15 Among these are ethnic responses to resource development 
and extraction by the state government. When a state government institutes policies of 
resource extraction in an exclusionary manner to the region from which the resources 
were extracted, ethnic mobilization is likely. They also identify the impact of diasporas as 
an important mobilizing factor for ethnic communities.16 Olzak goes on to discuss 
internal colonialism theories that state that resources are always unevenly distributed 
across states and that, as the state government increasingly becomes the distributor, 
decisions about how to parcel out development and revenue will lead to direct 
                                                 
11 Nicholas Sambanis, Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence (Brookings Trade Forum 
2004), 182. 
12 Ibid., 185-192. 
13 Ibid., 203. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Joanne Nagel and Susan Olzak, “Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the 
Competition Model,” Social Problems 30,2 (December 1982), 130-138. The five processes that these 
authors discuss are urbanization, increased scales of organization, expansion of secondary and tertiary 
economic sectors, expansion of the political sector, and the impact of supranatural organizations. 
16 Ibid., 138. 
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competition for resources by ethnic groups.17 These theories see state governments as 
foreign bodies that are viewed as invasive and kleptocratic by the local communities. 
Building further on Olzak’s work, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin argue 
that “the main factors influencing which countries will have civil war are not cultural or 
ethnic, but rather the conditions that favor insurgency.”18 They provide a series of 
hypotheses that seek to outline when civil conflict is likely. Of these, the presence of an 
ethnic majority relative to ethnic minority, measures of political democracy and civil 
liberties, and political instability at the government center are all factors that influence the 
risk of civil war.19 Further potential destabilizing elements are the presence of rough 
terrain poorly served by roads, the distance of the governmental center from conflict area, 
the separation of the governmental center from the conflict area by water, and the ability 
of the land in the conflict area to support high value goods to finance an insurgency.20  
Paul Collier builds upon the work of Fearon and Laitin by identifying five risk 
factors that make civil conflict more likely. These are high dependence on primary 
commodities in national GDP, a history of previous civil war, the size and influence of 
diasporas, the level of economic opportunities available (to include education), and the 
ethnic composition of the population or region with potential economic competitors.21 
Collier argues that ethnic homogeneity increases the risk of conflict while high ethnic 
diversity should make a region safer.22 These risk factors, combined with those identified 
by Fearon and Laitin will all bear relevance in my analysis of how governments counter 
ethnicity based insurgent groups. 
Once an ethnic group is mobilized to compete with the state government, what 
keeps it going? Chaim Kaufman discusses how conflict serves to harden ethnic identities 
                                                 
17 Susan Olzak, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization,” Annual Review of Sociology, 9 (1983), 366. 
18 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War (CA: Stanford, 2001), 2. 
19 Ibid., 5-7. 
20 Ibid., 7-11. 
21 Paul Collier, “The Economic Causes of Civil War and Their Implications for Policy,” in Turbulent 
Peace ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 147-149. 
22 Collier, The Economic Causes of Civil War and Their Implications for Policy, 149. 
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and creates a security dilemma that can only be solved in one of three manners: victory 
on the part of the ethnic community or the government, suppression, or self governance 
by the ethnic community through an arrangement of autonomous government.23 
Kaufmann’s work appears to principally address inter-ethnic conflict, but much of what 
he discusses can be applied to an ethnically based insurgency against a state government. 
His contributions will be important in my discussion by framing the impact of 
government policies on helping to keep ethnic insurgencies active or leading to 
resolution. 
“Ethnic identification is created or maintained as a basis for collective action 
when there are clearly competitive advantages to an ethnic identity.”24 In this manner, 
ethnic mobilization has been shown to have close links to resource competition.25 Ethnic 
nationalism provides a means for ethnic minorities to contest a state government due to 
grievances arising from perceived discrimination or simple cultural incompatibility.26 
Ultimately, rebels and insurgents have a broader purpose in mind though whether 
“redressing religious, nationalist, or economic grievances or simply seeking loot.”27 The 
approach views insurgents as simply seeking loot and sees economic civil war as a form 
of organized crime (as opposed to motivated by differences in ideology).28  
Others argue along these lines as well. In his research on the subject, Paul Collier 
cites the economist’s view that grievance is not as important as greed. Although popular 
discourse would have one believe that insurrections form as a result of ideological 
differences, some economists claim that the motivation for the conflict is not as important 
as the rebel organization’s ability to support itself through extra-legal means.29 In this 
                                                 
23 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 
20/4 (Spring 1996), 139. 
24 Nagel and Olzak, Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the Competition 
Model, 130. 
25 Ibid., 130. 
26 Fearon and Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 2. 
27 Ibid., 2. 
28 Collier, The Economic Causes of Civil War and Their Implications for Policy, 144. 
29 Ibid., 145. 
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manner insurgency, whether ethnically motivated or not, is organized crime. The 
perspective of economic civil war as organized crime will be a particularly important 
theoretical framework for addressing how state governments perceive the problem as 
well as how they approach dealing with ethnic insurgencies. 
Remaining within the framework of rebellion as a criminal activity, Collier states 
that a typical problem that rebellion face is how to gain finances and recruit members to 
overcome the initial entry threshold to be able to organize effectively while not being 
vanquished by the government they seek to oppose.30 This usually requires the rebellion 
to resort to extra-legal means, such a theft of natural resources and kidnapping, to get 
initial start-up capital. This perspective will also have implications for how the 
governments approach these insurgencies.  
Ethnic mobilization relative to resource conflict will be important to 
understanding not only how, when, and why ethnic insurgent groups mobilize, but also 
how state governments perceive these groups and react to them. Within the context of 
resource conflict, both the insurgent groups and the government see one another as 
stealing from the other. However, how the government approaches the threat will vary.  
3. Government Responses to Insurgency 
Insurgency is arguably one of the hardest military challenges for any state or 
military force to overcome. Scholars dating back to the 19th century and including such 
authors as Carl Von Clausewitz and B.H. Liddell-Hart have written about this form of 
warfare and what is needed to overcome it. With the advent of Maoist insurgency as a 
form of proxy warfare during the Cold War, analysis began to focus on why some 
insurgencies succeed and others fail. Classic insurgencies analyzed included the British 
experiences in Kenya and Malaya, French and U.S. experiences in Vietnam, and the 
Peruvian experience with Sendero Luminoso. From these and many others, lessons have 
been codified for how, and how not, to fight an insurgency. 
                                                 
30 Paul Collier, “Rebellion as Quasi-Criminal Activity,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/6 
(December 2000), 850. 
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Counter-insurgency strategies are determined by the kinds of foes a government 
faces and are as varied as the potential insurgent groups and their causes for fighting their 
government. Through the numerous prescriptions written for fighting insurgencies, 
several common themes can be observed. These include the requirement to “gain and 
maintain popular support, to have a legitimate and efficient government, a concerted 
effort in the political, economic, and social fields, dynamic military operations, and an 
enlightened leadership.”31 At the operational level further requirements include “civil-
military understanding, good intelligence, mobility, training, and the will to win.”32 The 
need for constant pressure and secrecy and surprise are also key elements in addressing 
an insurgent threat.33 The ultimate end-state is to separate the insurgents from their 
popular support base and neutralize them through social, political, economic, and military 
actions that reduce their grievance or killing the insurgent leadership, thereby ending the 
threat. 
At the operational level, counter-insurgency can largely be broken down into 
three approaches. These are the Direct Approach, Outside-In Approach, and Inside-Out 
Approach.34  
The Direct Approach uses conventional military forces to directly engage 
insurgents using conventional military tactics. Typically a government using this method 
will dispatch its military to conduct search and destroy activities in whatever environment 
the insurgents are operating.35 This approach is most common when an insurgency has 
reached a level of organization that sees it rapidly gaining support or is strong enough to 
be able to control areas and establish fixed bases of operation. 
                                                 
31 Baljit Singh and Ko-Wang Mei, Theory and Practice of Modern Guerrilla Warfare, (Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House, 1971), 68. 
32 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerilla Warfare, (New York: Walker 
and Company Publishing, 1967), 157, 168. 
33 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, 2006), 1-22-1-24.  
34 Michael A. Bottiglieri, How To Defeat Insurgencies: Searching for A Counter-Insurgency Strategy 
(Naval Postgraduate School: Master’s Thesis, December 2000), 4. 
35 Bottiglieri, 4. 
 10
The Outside-In Approach is an indirect approach that seeks to counter an 
insurgency by attacking the peripheral edges of the insurgency and working toward the 
center. Examples of this include “hearts and minds campaigns,”and political or economic 
concessions aimed at separating the insurgency from their popular support base.36 This 
approach is normally used when the insurgent group has strong popular support but either 
cannot or chooses not to establish fixed bases of operation. 
The Inside-Out Approach is an indirect approach to attacking an insurgent group 
that seeks to destroy the insurgent leadership and then target lower levels of the insurgent 
group until its group coherence is lost. The assumption behind this approach is that if the 
group loses its leadership, the masses will no longer be inclined to fight.37 This approach 
is used when the insurgencies’ grievances are ideological or political in nature and the 
leadership can be identified. 
These approaches to addressing insurgency can be generically applied to both 
ethnic and non-ethnically based insurgencies. Although much literature has appeared that 
discusses how various governments and militaries have responded to both ethnic and 
non-ethnic rebellion, a gap appears to exist in resources that provide theoretical analysis 
of how governments address insurgencies aimed at wresting control over state resources 
when the insurgent elements are mono-ethnic as opposed to multi-ethnic. Whereas a 
mono-ethnically based insurgent group usually has the advantage of a “homeland” that 
provides the means of secession, an insurgency comprised of multi-ethnic insurgent 
elements has the additional dynamic of inter-ethnic rivalry which prevents a viable 
secession movement from being started. These characteristics present both opportunities 
and constraints for the government fighting against each respective type of ethnic 
insurgency and will be the subject of this study. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Bottiglieri, 5. 
37 Ibid., 5. 
 11
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Major Questions and Argument 
My hypothesis is that a government facing a mono-ethnic insurgent threat 
competing with it for access to natural resources will have a greater ability to apply both 
direct and indirect approaches to counter-insurgency than a government facing multiple 
mono-ethnic insurgent elements due to the government’s ability to isolate the specific 
ethnic community from which the insurgent group is derived. Furthermore, it may have 
to adopt both measures due to the threat of secession by the ethnic group. However, these 
approaches are oftentimes at odds and frequently entail measures that will be considered 
repressive by both the ethnic community and international communities, inadvertently 
exacerbating and extending the conflict. In contrast, a government facing an insurgency 
comprised of multiple mono-ethnic insurgent elements will not initially face the same 
threat of secession, but will nonetheless have a difficult time resolving the insurgency 
problem through indirect approaches due to ethnic rivalries and competing grievances 
related to equitable resource distribution. However, due to the smaller size of the ethnic 
militias and their tendency to compete with one another for the same resources, the 
government is better able to minimize perceptions of a problem, declaring the insurgents 
to be criminal elements instead of a full blown insurgency. This approach will result in 
different risks for that government, specifically by continuing to allow the insurgency to 
continue unabated and potentially allowing a larger insurgent problem to develop if 
ethnic entrepreneurs can construct a new ethnic identity around which to rally a more 
potent insurgency force. 
2. Comparative Case Study 
This thesis will employ a two stage research design first looking at the nature of 
two ethnically delimited rebellions, then examining the responses of the two state 
governments that faced those ethnicity based resource insurgencies.  
The cases selected for this study are those of the ethnically homogenous 
insurgency in Aceh Indonesia and ethnically diverse insurgency in the Niger Delta in 
Nigeria. These cases allow for a method of difference analysis to be conducted that 
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controls for all critical variables except that of ethnicity. Because we can hold all of the 
variables in the insurgencies, minus ethnic unity, as constant, we can examine the 
government strategies. Variables being controlled are derived principally from Fearon 
and Laitin as well as Collier’s risk factors identified on page six.  
Although comparing insurgencies in Asia and Africa may seem unusual, in the 
case of these two insurgencies and the governments fighting them, they bear remarkable 
similarity. Both countries have colonial legacies; Indonesia received independence from 
Holland in 1945 while Nigeria achieved independence from Britain in 1960. Both 
governments of Indonesia and Nigeria are relatively democratic and, despite their 
problems, stable. Both governments have histories of poor civil rights that have drawn 
criticism and condemnation from the international community for the poor treatment of 
their citizenry. Both countries have a history of ethnic conflict and civil war; Indonesia 
suffered the loss of East Timor in 2002 and continues to suffer an ongoing ethnically 
based insurgency in Papua (formerly Irian Jaya). Nigeria suffered the Biafra War of 
1967, which witnessed the failed attempt by the Igbo ethnic group to secede from 
Nigeria. Both of these conflicts have inured the populations and governments to ethnic 
violence.  
The conflict areas themselves are also similar. Both Aceh and the Niger Delta are 
poorly developed with rough terrain poorly served by roads. Both areas are far from the 
centers of government; Aceh is located on Sumatra while Jakarta is located on Java; the 
Niger Delta is at the western-most part of Nigeria far from the capital in Abuja. In both 
cases, separation by water is a factor; as noted above, Aceh is on a separate island; the 
Niger Delta is comprised of a labyrinthine maze of mangrove swamps that makes vast 
portions of the region unreachable except by boat or aerial movement.  
The grievances of the insurgent groups are very similar with one critical exception 
that will be discussed below. Both insurgent groups protest the poor level of economic 
opportunities available to their communities and ethnic groups. This specifically includes 
the inequitable distribution of profits derived from the petroleum products extracted from 
their lands, poor access to employment and education, environmental impact of 
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petroleum extraction by the multinational energy companies that operate in both areas 
and the poor quality of infrastructure and health care.   
Both insurgent groups operate in areas that produce high value goods capable of 
supporting an insurgency. In the case of the Niger Delta, this commodity is oil, which is 
actively “bunkered” from pipelines and sold to external actors to fund the ongoing 
conflict. This is highly lucrative and enables the militia groups in the Niger Delta to be 
remarkably self-sufficient. In Aceh, natural resources such as drugs and timber provided 
much of the financing that the insurgent movement needed to remain viable. Both 
insurgent groups have diaspora populations that actively support their communities in the 
conflict areas. What funding requirements the insurgent group in Aceh could not derive 
from natural resources could be obtained from their diaspora as well as the ethnic 
community in Aceh that supports it. 
The ability of the Acehnese rebels to rely on an ethnic community to support them 
brings us to the biggest principle difference between the insurgencies: the degree of 
ethnic homogeneity. As an ethnically homogeneous community, Aceh is an ethnic 
community that sees itself as separate from the rest of Indonesia. As such their means of 
seeking a solution to their grievance is different than that of the insurgents in the Niger 
Delta. While the insurgents in the Niger Delta demand greater access to economic 
opportunity and steal oil to bleed the government of revenue thereby hoping to bring 
them to the negotiating table, the insurgents in Aceh demanded greater access to 
economic opportunity through secession from Indonesia.  
The insurgencies in Aceh and the Niger Delta have been fought using principally 
conventional troops from the Indonesian Armed Forces and Nigerian Federal Army. Both 
militaries have used brutally repressive tactics but the scale of the repression in Aceh 
exceeded that of the Niger Delta. The reason for this can be attributed to the combination 
of direct and indirect counter-insurgency tactics used by the Indonesian troops owing to 
the ethnic homogeneity of the insurgent group and population supporting it. In contrast, 
the Nigerian military seeks to brand the insurgents as criminals and engage with minimal 
force. Although military actions do take place periodically (and are executed with 
exceeding force and brutality), the Nigerian government response principally seeks to 
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safeguard its assets (oil production facilities) and negotiate an end to the “criminality” 
with ethnic community leaders due to the diverse ethnic backgrounds of the insurgents. 
In each case, the development and prosecution of each insurgency will be 
examined. Using a constructivist approach to ethnicity, a brief background will be 
provided for the ethnic composition of both conflict areas. The economic factors that 
intensified the development of Acehnese nationalism will be examined through an 
analysis of Geraken Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the separatist movement it launched 
against the Indonesian government starting in 1976. Similarly, the economic factors 
leading to the marginalization of the ethnic communities in the Niger Delta will be used 
to examine the mobilization of ethnically homogeneous youth militias operating against 
the Nigerian Federal Government and Multinational Oil Corporations in the Niger Delta. 
It will be shown that these militias are no fewer in number than their Acehnese 
counterparts but that the lack of ethnic unity prevents them from coalescing as a single 
insurgency force. 
The military approaches used by the Indonesian and Nigerian governments will 
then be presented and analyzed with the distinctions of how the ethnic composition of the 
insurgent groups impact the approaches taken to addressing these insurgencies. The 
challenges and opportunities that are afforded the governments based on the mono-ethnic 
or multi-ethnic compositions of each insurgent group will be presented and compared 
with the operational implementation of each country’s military plans. To the degree that 
the links between government policy and military execution can be examined, they will. 
In the absence of this, operations will be analyzed based upon end-states on the ground. 
In conclusion, analysis will be conducted that shows how the impact of ethnic 
composition on counterinsurgency operations against resource competitors actually 
produces counterintuitive results. The implications of these counterintuitive results will 
comprise the final sub-section of the thesis. 
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II. NIGER DELTA 
 
Figure 1.   The Niger Delta38 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing conflict between the ethnically delimited communities of the Niger 
Delta and the Nigerian Federal Government provides a textbook example of an ethnicity 
based resource competition, but more importantly, one that is multi-ethnic in nature. 
Since the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta in 1956, access to the revenues derived from 
petroleum has become a source of high tension between the ethnic communities and the 
federal government in Abuja. This chapter will trace the evolution of the multi-ethnic 
insurgency from its roots as communal militias to the current insurgency manifested by 
ethnicity-delimited militias fighting with the Nigerian Federal Government for access to 
resource wealth. It will be shown that this insurgency, whose roots lie in economic 
                                                 
38 Map taken from ICG Report No. 118 Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis,(Brussels: International Crisis 
Group, September 28, 2006), 28. 
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grievances that arose following the discovery of petroleum in the region in the 1960s, has 
never been able to constitute a serious enough threat to challenge the government for 
territorial claim to the area. 
Government responses will next be examined. Analysis will show that despite the 
challenges levied by the insurgency, the ethnically heterogeneous nature of the 
insurgency has allowed the government to avoid engaging in a costly counter-insurgency 
due to the inability of the insurgent elements to coalesce into a coherent separatist threat. 
This has enabled the government to adopt a response that is repressive while not 
conceding to the demands of the insurgents or their communal supporters. Through an 
approach that combines security tactics aimed at safeguarding the oil industry 
infrastructure while approaching the insurgent elements as criminals, the ethnic militias 
have been contained to a degree that prevents them from challenging the territorial 
integrity of the state.  
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, called the “South-South,” comprises the 
southwestern portion of the country, bordering the Gulf of Guinea. Nine states are 
normally associated with the South-South: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers states (see Figure 1). The Niger Delta measures over 
16,000 square miles and, being roughly equal to the size of Scotland, is one of the 
world’s largest sedimentary basins. Within this area is a rich endowment of biodiversity, 
including Nigeria’s remaining primary forest and the world’s third largest mangrove 
swamp. With an elevation rarely rising above 50 feet and very poor ground drainage, the 
Niger Delta is a forbidding area comprised of dense jungle, punctuated by a complex 
system of fresh and brackish water stream systems, estuaries, mudflats, tidal marshes, and 
coastal forests. Rainfall is plentiful and the relative humidity never drops below 80%. 
Travel by road is impossible in some areas with access only obtainable through 
waterborne travel or helicopter.39 
Despite this challenging terrain and climate, the Niger Delta is home to an 
estimated 20 million people, though census statistics are not wholly reliable. The people 
                                                 
39 Sofiri Peterside and Patterson Ogon, Background Paper: The Niger Delta. 
www.globetrotter.berkeley.edu/GreenGovernance/papers/Nigeriabckgrd.pdf (accessed January 8, 2007). 
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of the Niger Delta live through a mixture of subsistence farming, fishing, and limited 
commercial enterprises. Although only five major linguistic categories are represented in 
the greater Niger Delta region, the inhabitants have developed into over 40 different 
ethnic groups. Over 3,000 ethno-linguistically delimited communities have taken root 
wherever arable land is available, in a pattern that makes discerning ethnic “homelands” 
challenging; the Niger Delta appears as a patchwork quilt of ethnic groups. The result is 
an enormously complex ethnic landscape that mottles the region and makes ethnicity-
based competition common. The largest ethnic group in the region is the Ijaw with others 
including the Isoko, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Ogoni, and a score of other smaller ethnic groups 
living in ethnically defined enclaves. These ethnic groups not only compete with other 
ethnic groups, but also amongst themselves along clan lines.40 
Among the most impoverished communities in Nigeria, the inhabitants of the 
Niger Delta live in a level of poverty and deprivation that is ironic given the amount of 
revenue that is derived from their lands. Petroleum from the Niger Delta’s provides 80% 
of the government’s revenue and 95% of the country’s export earnings.41 However little 
of this is seen by the local communities of the region. Although the oil-producing states 
receive a large cut of the revenue, most of it is lost to corruption and mismanagement 
within the state and local governments.42 Urban centers like Port Harcourt and Warri 
have experienced enormous growth in infrastructure while the outlying areas exist in 
primitive under-development.43 
Compounding this deprivation is the extreme ecological despoliation of the 
region, leading to a severe impact on the ability of the already impoverished people to 
exist by traditional subsistence means. Between 1976 and 1996, an estimated 1.8 million 
barrels of oil have been spilled in the Niger Delta. Gas flaring, the practice of burning off 
                                                 
40 ICG Report No. 115 The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Niger Delta Unrest (Dakar/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, August 3, 2006), 26-27. This article provides several examples of this 
competition including community competition over political zoning, land boundaries, and access to 
revenues and benefits distributed by oil companies. 
41 ICG Report No. 113 Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis 
Group, July 19, 2006), 19. 
42 Ibid., 21.  
43 Ibid. 
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excess natural gas that is extracted in the course of oil pumping, furthers the ecological 
problems by creating poor atmospheric conditions and additional contamination.  
Despite the grievances of the Niger Delta communities and even attempts to 
address them by state and federal government commissions, the problems have failed to 
be resolved. By any measure, the Nigerian Federal Government has not done enough to 
address these grievances.44 Over the last 10 years, growing agitation amongst the Niger 
Delta communities has culminated in the development of civic action groups and armed 
militias, principally organized along ethnic lines who clamor for increased benefits from 
the oil revenues. (These civic action groups and militias will be addressed in detail later 
in this chapter.)  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Ethnic competition is nothing new to this region. Over the last 300 years, the 
different ethnic communities of the region have competed with one another or been 
exploited by outsiders through the various phases of external influence. Between 1650 
and 1800, these communities competed over access to the slave trade.45 Slave raiding 
was a common activity that saw the different ethnic communities selling members of one 
another’s neighboring communities to the British and other European slave trading 
powers.46  
Following Britain’s banning of the slave trade in 1807, the focus shifted to the 
cultivation of palm oil, then a critical resource in Europe used in soap, candles, and as a 
lubricant used in the machinery of the industrial revolution.47 The communities who had 
                                                 
44 Uwem E. Ite, “Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries: A Case 
Study of Nigeria,” Corporate Social-Responsibility and Environmental Management; 11, (March 2004), 1-
10. The Niger Delta is the virtual poster child for activist groups taking aim at multi-national corporations 
for failing to provide sufficient services and benefits to the indigenous inhabitants of regions where they 
operate. 
45 Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 12. 
An estimated 24 percent of West Africa’s slaves were exported from the Niger Delta/Bight of Biafra 
region. 
46 Karl Maier, This House Has Fallen (Colorado, Westview Press, 2000), 119-122. 
47 Martin Lynn, “The West African Palm Oil Trade” in Robin Law (ed.) From Slave Trade to 
Legitimate Commerce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 23-25. 
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previously colluded in the slave trade found new opportunities in exporting palm oil. The 
chiefs of the various ethnic communities established a tenuous relationship with the 
British National African Company, which successfully banded together the various palm 
oil companies in 1879.48  
This relationship provided a harbinger of the external exploitation and inter-
communal competition that was to come. The chiefs who signed these treaties often did 
not understand that they were effectively ceding their sovereignty to the British Crown. 
By 1884, the British had secured thirty-seven treaties with local chiefs and maintained a 
fleet of twenty gunboats to punish any Africans who challenged British authority. The 
National African Company established its own legal system, complete with territorial 
administrators, court, prison system, police and secret service. The police of the National 
African Company looked out solely for the interests of the European traders, much in the 
same way that “supernumerary” police protect the multi-national oil companies today.49 
The company set out to completely monopolize the palm oil exports from the Delta and 
cared little for the middlemen tending the plantations. An onerous system of tariffs and 
licenses was put in place by the company and anyone seeking to circumvent them risked 
execution. Punitive raids against non-compliant Niger Delta communities were not 
uncommon.  
This exploitation reached a boiling point in 1895 when Ijaw King William Koko 
took the offensive and launched an attack against a neighboring commercial company, 
the Royal Niger Company.50 Fortified by their belief in the Ijaw god of war, Egbesu, over 
a thousand warriors painted in white chalk set out in war canoes and launched a dawn 
attack on the company headquarters in Akassa. The British retaliatory attack against the 
Ijaw kingdom at Nembe resulted in the leveling of several villages and the systematic 
                                                 
48 Maier, 120. 
49 Scott Pegg, “The Cost of Doing Business. Transnational Corporations and Violence in Nigeria,” 
Security Dialogue 30 (1999), 75.The supernumerary police are a special detachment of the Nigeria Police 
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50 Maier, 121. 
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killing of several hundred people.51 Although the palm oil industry waned in the 1920s, 
British punitive missions against Niger Delta communities continued until well after 
Nigeria was composed as a colony in 1914. More than 50 women were killed in 1929 
when police fired on groups of women protesting against a purported new tax aimed at 
their income.52  
In the 1950s, with the approach of Nigeria’s independence, the ethnic 
communities of the Niger Delta argued that the British had no right to hand them over to 
the new nation-state.53 This argument was based on the desire of traditional elites to 
maintain control over their own affairs and the belief that a central Nigerian authority, 
most likely from another ethnic group, would seek to exploit other groups to the 
betterment of their own. The British response, stemming from Sir Henry Willink’s 
Commission on Minority Groups, was to reject independence for the delta communities, 
as well as granting them the status of a state within Nigeria.54 But the commission 
recognized, in a foreshadowing of the complaints of today, that among the people of the 
Niger Delta lay a deep-rooted conviction that the authorities of the central government 
failed to grasp the complexity of their situation.55 As a result, the Willink Commission 
recommended the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board, which among 
other things, required that no more than 50% of the revenues derived from the region 
could be taken from it.56 
                                                 
51 ICG Report No. 115 The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Niger Delta Unrest, 3. 
52 Ibid., 4. 
53 Stephen Wright, Nigeria Struggle for Stability and Status, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 23-
24. 
54 R.T. Akinyele, “States Creation in Nigeria: The Willink Report in Retrospect,” African Studies 
Review 39 (September 1996), 71-94. The Willink Commission’s report remains a source of controversy 
today. The aim of this British colonial commission was to determine the legitimacy of concerns by ethnic 
minorities in the then colony of Nigeria that they would be manipulated and disenfranchised by the larger 
ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, Ibo, Yoruba) once the colony achieved independence. Many Nigerians 
conclude that the commission largely ignored its findings and provided contradictory advise to the colonial 
administrators deciding how best to establish the state of Nigeria. 
55 Maier, 123. 
56 Augustine Ikelegbe, “The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” 
Nordic Journal of African Studies 14 (2005), 214. 
 21
These complexities became even more convoluted in 1956. The Niger Delta 
communities did not know it then, but as the Willink Commission was gathering its 
evidence, the future of the Delta had taken a dramatic and unexpected turn. In the Ijaw 
community of Oloibiri, the Shell Petroleum Company had discovered oil.57 Like the 19th 
century palm oil boom that saw British colonial interests take hold of the Niger Delta, 
this meant that an independent Nigerian government would be loathe to loosen its control 
over the region. The rapid rise of petroleum revenues to dominate the Nigerian economy 
had a reverse effect on the region from which these resources were extracted. Much as 
they had feared, the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta faced massive 
disenfranchisement by larger ethnic groups, this time at the helm of the Nigerian Federal 
Government. The people of the Niger Delta would only see poverty and environmental 
degradation as a result of Nigeria’s oil windfall. 
In 1967, the Federal Government created twelve states, replacing the previously 
instituted regional system the government had inherited from the British at independence 
in 1960. This decision was made to not only soothe remaining ethnic concerns about 
resource distribution and political representation, but also for provide a means for 
implementing more effective political control through state and local governments.58 By 
adopting a state structure, greater control would be afforded to state governments. This 
appeared to be a step toward satisfying the aspirations by the Niger Delta communities to 
have more control over their own resources. The distribution of oil revenues was based 
upon a derivation principle that sought to equitably provide access of oil revenues to all 
parts of the country.59 However, the principle beneficiaries were the federal government 
and the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta. The economic trajectory for the Niger 
Delta appeared to be an optimistic one. 
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Between 1967 and 1970, Nigeria was wracked by Civil War. Began as a result of 
ethnic Igbo aspirations to establish the sovereign Republic of Biafra, a state in which the 
Igbo would be the ethnic majority, it was among the costliest civil conflicts the world has 
seen, witnessing widespread devastation and the killing of over one million Nigerians.60 
Initially included in the Igbo bid for secession, the Niger Delta was quickly reclaimed by 
the federal government where the majority of Niger Delta communities would support the 
government effort to maintain the territorial integrity of the country.61 The end of the 
Nigerian Civil War would see reconciliation between the federal government and the 
Igbo secessionists. The Nigerian Civil War would leave an indelible impression on the 
psyche of the country— the Nigerian government would not easily part with its territory.  
Following the end of Nigerian Civil War the revenue percentages previously 
established by the federal government were systematically reduced from 50% to a mere 
1.5% by the military government then in power.62 The rationale for this action was to 
centralize oil revenues with the federal government in order to pay for the civil war, but 
also to address budgetary imbalances in the states. While the southern states may have 
been the source of the wealth, the northern states were more populous. The derivation 
principle used to allocate federally controlled revenues had resulted in the failure of the 
northern states to receive adequate funds to run their state budgets.63 Moreover, the 
northern states were home to the largest and most dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria. In a 
political system that saw ethnicity as a critical variable, Nigerian elites had little choice 
but to account for it. 
This redistribution of revenues also heralded the beginnings of economic 
corruption in Nigeria. This adjustment in revenue distribution also came as a result of the 
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increases in oil prices and production during 1973-80. These were the boom years of the 
Nigerian economy and the government sought to centralize control of all oil revenues in a 
bid to consolidate their power.64 However this was an economy out of control. Both 
government expenditure and public consumption exploded, with the majority of revenues 
being funneled to non-oil producing states in an effort to capitalize on economic growth. 
Financial indiscipline and corruption became entrenched.65 However, little of this fiscal 
windfall was seen in the Niger Delta. In an ironic twist, not only was the region deprived 
of the revenues that came from oil extracted from the Niger Delta, but the region received 
the lowest amount of development funding that came from the oil revenues. The rest of 
Nigeria, particularly the northern states from which the military leaders came, received 
the bulk of the federal development moneys to build infrastructure while the communities 
of the Niger Delta languished.66 
In 1978, General Olusegun Obasanjo, then military ruler of the country, 
implemented a land reform policy that transferred the ownership of all land, as well as the 
mineral resources contained therein, to the federal government. Implemented as a result 
of precipitous rise in the reliance upon petroleum revenues for the economic well-being 
of the country, this legislation effectively stripped the local communities and states of 
control over their land, resources, or the oil companies.67 Oil had become a matter of 
“national security.”68 In the years that followed, which saw Nigeria’s second attempt at 
democracy ended by military coup, the level of accountability and transparency of oil 
revenues dwindled yet further.   
Throughout the years of military rule, the level of marginalization only increased 
in the Niger Delta. This was not due to a lack of effort on the part of the military leaders 
to address concerns, but instead reflected the patrimonial and ethnically defined nature of 
politics in Nigeria. New states were created in 1967 (and subsequently increased in 
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number in 1976, 1987, 1991, and 1996) as a means to provide adequate representation to 
the diversity of the population.69 By 1996, thirty-six states had been created in Nigeria 
under the premise that smaller ethnic groups would be able to better control their affairs 
through local and state governments.70 Paradoxically, the effect of the creation of new 
states was the reverse of what was intended. This is due to the reliance of these largely 
“nonviable” political entities on up to 80% of their income from the federal 
government.71 These state and local governments were rife with corruption, and fiscal 
resources that were distributed to them were absorbed in the patrimonial client networks.  
Compounding this problem was the fact that politics in Nigeria are largely driven 
by ethnic identity. The larger ethnic groups in the states were able to dominate local 
politics thereby directing more of the financial resources distributed by the government 
into their client networks. For the ethnic minorities, this meant further marginalization 
and competition for increasingly scarce resources. In the Niger Delta, where the majority 
of the communities are ethnic minorities, this translated into still further deprivation. 
The culmination of the centralization of resource distribution with the systematic 
creation of smaller ethnically focused states and local governments that were highly 
susceptible to corruption, was the hastening of economic collapse.72 Symptomatic of this 
collapse was the increase in poverty and crime throughout many parts of the country. 
Starting in the mid-1980s and proceeding into the 1990s, this economic decline would see 
crime become a rampant problem across Nigeria, including the Niger Delta. As the 
federal government failed to address the problem, the ethnically delimited communities 
began to focus on militancy as a means for their own survival. 
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C. CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC COMPETITION AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF INSURGENCY 
Ethnic militias are actually not new to the Niger Delta or Nigeria. The roots of 
“armed communal self defense forces” traces back to pre-colonial times when indigenous 
communities maintained groups of warriors to serve as security against both internal and 
external threats against them.73 Despite British efforts to abolish them, these militias 
continued to be maintained by the ethnically delimited communities. The militias gained 
their legitimacy and authority from the communities they supported, answering to 
traditional elites and serving as economic and political vanguards for the interests of the 
communities they represented. Following independence, the Nigerian government 
forbade the continued use of militias as community self-defense or vigilante forces. 
However, many communities continued to encourage their able-bodied men to serve as 
auxiliaries for the state police force in the capacity of local ethnic militias. This was due 
to the limited effectiveness and availability of federal police. In this capacity the 
communities were essentially self-monitoring, helping to apprehend criminals and 
maintain intra-communal resolutions. 
These militias initially started out as night patrols and community watch groups 
aimed at curbing the rampant criminal activities that followed the rapid urbanization and 
economic decline as oil prices stabilized. In addition to traditional elites, local and state 
governments as well as police forces approved of these groups.74 By the mid-1990s, the 
unrelenting wave of violent crime and heightened frustration by Nigeria’s communities 
with the inefficiency of state police, provided the rationale for having the militias as 
vigilante forces augment or even take the place of police forces. The then military 
government of Nigeria tacitly approved of these measures requiring that these militias be  
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controlled by traditional elites.75 The functions of these militias would change over time 
as economic and political marginalization led to increasingly radicalized ideas of how to 
overcome the these challenges. 
In examining the phenomenon of ethnic insurgency in the Niger Delta, three 
distinct phases can be observed in its development. The transition in the first two phases 
roughly coincides with the 1998-1999 democratization of the Nigerian Federal 
Government, when General Abdulsalami Abubaker transitioned the government back to 
democratic rule. The reason for this year being the breakpoint in the phases of the 
militias’ development is that democratization coupled with the years of economic 
deprivation resulted in the co-opting of ethnic militias by political contenders. The stakes 
in the ethnic political game were high and militias were actively used to support political 
candidates through the suppression of other political candidates (and their militias).  
Prior to this time, the ethnic militias had been largely a communal phenomenon 
that focused on vigilante actions aimed at safeguarding their communities, though this 
included fighting with the federal government and other ethnic groups. In the months 
leading up to the 1999 elections, political aspirants armed these militias and turned them 
loose on civil society in an effort to win bids for election through intimidation. Following 
the elections, these now well-armed militants had outgrown their usefulness and were 
either cast off or assigned different, largely criminal roles by the newly elected political 
elites. This cycle again occurred in 2003. Though conclusive evidence directly linking the 
militias to politicians is largely anecdotal, it is a widely accepted fact that this linkage 
exists.76  
The latest phase in the development of the militias marks the beginnings of 
insurgency aimed at the Nigerian government. Beginning in late 2005 with the advent of 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Joint Revolutionary 
                                                 
75 R. T. Akinyele, “Ethnic Militancy and National Stability in Nigeria: A Case Study in the Oodua 
People’s Congress,” African Affairs 100 (October 2001), 628. 
76 Isiaka Alani Badmus, “Ethnic Militia Movements and the Crisis of Political Order in Post-Military 
Nigeria,” Journal of Social Science 13 (2002), 191-198. This article offers a perspective on the linkages 
between ethnic militias and competition amongst Nigerian political contenders. 
 27
Council,77 ethnically delimited though highly organized and well-equipped militant 
elements began to appear. MEND acts as an umbrella organization for several Ijaw 
militia groups and actively challenges the Abuja government, using oil theft and kidnap 
tactics to fund their activities while attacking oil installations and Nigerian federal troops. 
Though these tactics are similar to those seen between 1999 and 2003, the frequency and 
lethality of their attacks as well as the skilled use of public relations in elucidating their 
demands clearly shows a level of organization that had not previously existed.  
1. Militia Development until 1998 
The year 1966, six years after the country’s independence, would see the first 
armed ethnic uprising in the Niger Delta. Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, a former policeman of 
Ijaw ethnicity mustered a small contingent of 150 Ijaw peasants in a spirited but largely 
hopeless attempt to achieve independence for the Niger Delta communities.78 Raising the 
flag of an independent “Niger Delta People’s Republic” on February 23, 1966, he 
declared all oil contracts void and directed the oil companies to negotiate directly with 
him and his new administration.79 Boro’s attempt at independence was short-lived. 
Within 12 days of declaring independence, he and his rebellion had been subdued by 
federal troops.80 Although Boro was unsuccessful, he serves today as a folk hero and icon 
of inspiration for Ijaws and other ethnic militants in the Niger Delta. 
During the steady economic decline of the 1980s, the Niger Delta witnessed the 
extensive development of civil action groups whose goal was to seek a outlet for their 
economic grievances. These groups developed along the lines of ethnic unions during the 
1950s and 1960s as a result of community efforts to pool resources to support their 
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communities and to address increasing political and economic marginalization.81 These 
civil action groups included environmental groups, civil rights groups, ethnic youth 
associations, and pan-ethnic civil groups.82 Examples of these groups include the Niger 
Delta Human and Environmental Rescue Organization (ND-HERO), an environmental 
group; Ijaw National Congress (INC), Isoko Development Union (IDU), Movement for 
the Survival of the Itsekiri Nationality (MOSIEN), and Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP), all ethnic civil groups; the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Isoko 
National Youth Movement (INYM), and Urhobu Youth Movement (UYOMO), all ethnic 
youth groups; and the Concerned Youths of Oil Producing States and Niger Delta Peace 
Project Committee, both pan-ethnic civil groups.83 Many of these civil action groups had 
or later developed “armed wings” in the form of informal security groups or ethnic 
militias, particularly in the late 1980s and 1990s.   
Comprised exclusively of young men, these militias tended to be organized along 
ethno-linguistic lines and were exclusive of other ethnic groups. The militias focused on 
ensuring that other ethnic groups or communities didn’t compromise the limited 
economic resources available to them. However, as the level of economic marginalization 
increased, which included lack of employment for the majority of the youths, the militias 
began to adopt an ideology that saw them as repressed. Increasingly angry and frustrated 
with their lot in life, these militias began to look for outlets which included agitation 
aimed at the oil companies as well as crime. 
Oil theft or “illegal bunkering” began during the late 1980s but steadily increased 
in its level of severity throughout the following decade.84 These activities saw not only 
militias, but also whole communities becoming involved in the theft and resale of stolen 
oil. The multi-national oil corporations sought assistance from the state and federal 
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governments in an effort to curtail the problem. One of the results of the oil theft 
phenomenon has been the increase in security by the oil corporations, including the 
employment of “supernumerary” police and security guards. In most cases, these security 
personnel are deliberately hired from outside of the ethnic community in which they will 
be serving in order to forestall any potential for collusion between the guards and the 
local community.85 As a result of these practices, inter-ethnic tensions are only 
exacerbated. 
The descent of the Niger Delta economy, indeed the whole Nigerian economy, 
into further levels of decrepitude during the 1990s resulted in increased anger and inter-
ethnic tensions in the Niger Delta. Among the more notable of these were the Ijaw-
Itsekiri in Delta State and Ijaw-Ilaje conflicts in Ondo State from 1997-1999. During this 
period, hundreds died as a result of ethnic militias clashing over the distribution of oil 
revenues.86 These clashes only served to enhance the already well-defined ethnic 
divisions of the Niger Delta. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, direct confrontations with the federal government 
occurred but were on more limited basis than after democratization. Funds for weapons 
and equipment were not as available as they were following the political campaigns of 
1999 and 2003. Confrontations did occur though as armed militias began to direct their 
frustration toward the multi-national oil corporations actively extracting petroleum from 
their lands. The most well publicized confrontation was that of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) that saw this small ethnic minority challenge the 
military government of General Ibrahim Babangida.87 The suppression of this activist 
movement and movements like it resulted in a militarization of the Niger Delta, wherein 
extensive military garrisons were established to safeguard oil production facilities.88 
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These government actions were major contributors to the development of more violent 
militia movements such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, one of the most 
formidable ethnic militias in the region.89 
Intra-ethnic societal changes in the Niger Delta also impacted the rise in ethnic 
militancy. This phenomenon began largely in the 1990s where a breakdown in civil 
society between youths and their traditional elders became apparent. The term “youths” 
in many parts of Africa, including the Niger Delta, is a collective term that refers to 
anyone who is not of the chief class or in a position of traditional leadership within an 
ethnic community. Youths are more a social class than an indicator of chronological age; 
members of youth groups range in age between 20 and 45. These powerless youths 
lacked political and economic opportunities and grew increasingly frustrated with the 
seeming failure of their traditional ethnic leaders to look out for their needs.90 A principle 
complaint by the disenfranchised youths was that they not only lack economic 
opportunities, but the traditional elites were in collusion with the government to deprive 
the majority of communities of their ‘rightful’ resources. As such, the youths of ethnic 
communities increasingly formed their own civil organizations and disregarded the 
guidance of traditional elites and elders, in their pursuit of economic and political 
opportunity. 
By the end of the long period of military governance, the ethnic militias in the 
Niger Delta were well established. Controlled by a combination of communal leaders as 
well as “youth councils”, these militias proliferated. Between economic and social 
conditions that encouraged youths to join these groups and the requirement for ethnically 
delimited communities to fight for their share of the limited resources available to them, 
the stage was set for these armed groups to be used as private armies of political 
contenders as the country strode toward democracy.  
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2. Evolution of Ethnic Militias, 1998-2005 
With the advent of democratization efforts in 1998, long suppressed political and 
civil activities could again be conducted. Political and civil associations multiplied. In the 
competitive environment of Nigerian democratic processes, the militias became tools for 
local political aspirants. Since most local politics were organized along ethnic and 
communal lines, this resulted in the militias becoming ethnic paramilitary groups serving 
their political masters, who were incidentally, all of the same ethnicity. As will be seen in 
the next chapter, this was the opposite effect of what occurred in Aceh, where 
democratization and liberalization led to greater ethnic coherency under the guise of 
ethnic nationalism.  
As previously discussed, the advent of democracy brought about the co-optation 
of the ethnic militias by political aspirants.91 With access to weapons and equipment 
through their political sponsors, the lethality and effectiveness of the militias expanded 
greatly. Within the Niger Delta, political competition led to pitched ethnic fighting where 
fighting over economic interests had already taken place. This fighting left hundreds dead 
and thousands displaced. In 1998, 1999, and again in 2003, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Ilaje, and 
Urhobo militias fought with each other and Nigerian military forces over political zoning 
in the City of Warri as well as access to oil company payouts to host communities from 
which the oil was extracted.92 Clashes between Ijaw and Yoruba left at least 50 dead in 
1999 in a dispute over ownership of an oil field.93 In some cases, intra-ethnic fighting 
took place as observed in militia violence perpetrated by rival Ijaw clans in 2002-2003.94 
Although the fighting ended with the state government mediating between the ethnic 
communities, the inter-ethnic rivalries continue to simmer. A popular theory amongst 
both state political leaders and several academics is that these politicians continue to use  
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the militias in an effort to maintain political leverage. Recent years have seen the 
Obasanjo government instituting significant anti-corruption campaigns aimed at 
amending this problem.95 
At the end of each of the political seasons in 1999 and 2003, the use of ethnic 
militants for political purposes eased. The newly armed and still disenfranchised youths 
returned to patrolling the Niger Delta in the pursuit of economic opportunities. Today the 
array of political associations and ethnic militias in the Niger Delta is “simply mind-
boggling;” an array of pseudo-political and militant groups have arisen that challenges 
attempts to effectively catalogue them.96 As the political, economic, and ecological 
situation in the Niger Delta has continued to deteriorate, the ethnic militias have 
increasingly turned their efforts against the Nigerian government and their perceived 
colluders, the multi-national oil corporations. 
Starting in the late 1990s, these efforts included the kidnapping of oil workers for 
ransom, the attack and occupation of oil installations located in the swamps, and the 
deliberate shut-down of oil production.97 These actions were accompanied by a variety of 
demands ranging from more equitable distribution of employment opportunities to 
ransom demands for monetary payout. In all cases, the paying of ransom or adjustment of 
petroleum benefit distributions to specified communities has resulted in resolutions. 
Although oil workers and security forces have been killed in attacks on facilities, the 
militias have been careful to ensure that no hostages were mistreated or killed while in 
their custody. 
Oil theft, which began in the 1980s on a minor scale, rose to an astonishingly high 
level. Today the practice of siphoning, transporting, and selling crude oil to international 
buyers is now acknowledged as the primary means by which the Niger Delta militias 
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have financed their activities.98 Estimates vary on the amount of oil that is being stolen, 
with figures ranging between 70,000 and 300,000 barrels per day.99 Even a loss of only 
70,000 barrels per day would “generate over $1.5 billion dollars per year—ample 
resources to fund arms trafficking, buy political influence, or both.”100 In 2005, the 
practice of oil bunkering reduced Nigeria’s enormous oil output by upwards of 10-
15%.101 Some estimates have cited the loss of revenue to be as high as 40% during 
periods of particularly aggressive militant action.102 
Operating with impunity throughout the complex maze of inland waterways and 
stream networks, the militias’ intimate knowledge of their environment has enabled them 
to elude the government’s limited efforts to directly interdict their activities. Despite 
government requests that traditional ethnic leaders reign in the militias, efforts at doing so 
have been largely fruitless.103 Some of the militias operate for purely self-serving and 
criminal motivations. With few economic opportunities, crime has become their means of 
deriving income. However, increasingly the militias have been making demands for 
significant reform in how the government approaches development and economic growth 
in the Niger Delta. This has included militias from the Ijaw, Ilaje, Yoruba, Isoko, Ikwere, 
Ogoni, and Urhobo ethnic groups.104 These groups clamor for audience with the Abuja 
government, seeking to initiate dialogue through violence, while intermittently fighting 
one another over political and economic benefits. 
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3. The Rise of Insurgency 2005 to Present 
In late 2005, the first in a series of umbrella organizations began to emerge that 
sought to organize militia activities in the Niger Delta.105 The most prominent of these 
has been the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).106 As an 
umbrella organization, MEND has taken the resource competition in the Niger Delta to a 
new level. Among other results, their activities have resulted in the first real media use of 
the word insurgency. Displaying a level of media awareness, coordination, and 
sophistication previously unseen in the conflict, MEND has succeeded in gaining 
international notoriety and attention for their activities by broadcasting their intensions 
through the use of a spokesman and then following through with their threats.107 With an 
unprecedented amount of firepower including heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled 
grenades, MEND has successfully attacked both oil facilities and Nigerian security 
forces. Using para-military tactics including standardized tactics for riverine operations, 
recent MEND activities have included the seizure of foreign contractors from an oil 
platform located 20 km off-shore (during which a Nigerian Navy vessel was forced to 
retreat), an attack on a Nigerian Navy barge that resulted in the deaths of 14 military 
personnel,108 and the attack on a Port Harcourt police station to free a jailed MEND 
Leader.109  
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Although claiming to unite several militia groups, MEND remains ostensibly an 
ethnically delimited organization. The militia that are supposedly unified under MEND 
are all Ijaw militias. Both the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NPDVF) and 
Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), which are the largest militia that 
MEND claims to coordinate, are comprised of insurgents of Ijaw nationality.110  
This does not discount the danger that MEND poses to the Nigerian government. 
With the Ijaw being the majority ethnic population in the Niger Delta, an umbrella 
organization such as MEND that furthers unifies an ethnic group such as the Ijaw could 
indeed pose a significant threat. However, because the militias and insurgent 
organizations in the Niger Delta remain organized along ethnic lines, there will continue 
to be natural cleavages that make the most serious threat, that of an organized separatist 
movement, difficult to pursue. Although there is likely to be limited cross-ethnic 
coordination, this conflict continues to be one that is principally organized and fought 
unilaterally by separate ethnic groups fighting for their ethnic groups, clans, 
communities, or themselves. As long as it remains as such, the Nigerian Government has 
other options outside of full-blown counter-insurgency.  
D. NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
An examination of the Nigerian Government’s responses reveals that few changes 
have taken place in how the government has approached the insurgency in the Niger 
Delta, since the days of military rule in the 1980s through today. Using a consistently 
repressive approach to quelling communal uprisings, the overwhelming approach has 
been one that focused on police or military action aimed at “keeping the peace” while 
identifying communal agitators, particularly the militias, as criminal elements. However 
there are some subtle differences. In order to best analyze the government’s responses to 
the rise of ethnic insurgency in the Niger Delta, it is useful to analyze those responses in 
conjunction with the developmental phases of the insurgency. In doing so, it will be 
shown that the Nigerian government has continually attempted to keep the insurgency 
suppressed but is not conducting counter-insurgency.  
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Before examining these responses, it will be helpful to identify what a counter-
insurgency campaign in the Niger Delta might look like. As identified in Chapter I, an 
effective counter-insurgency strategy requires that a government “gain and maintain 
popular support, have a legitimate and efficient government, make a concerted effort in 
the political, economic, and social fields, execute dynamic military operations, and have 
an enlightened leadership.”111 Although President Obasanjo may be construed as an 
enlightened leader, the other elements are distinctly missing, or at very least failing to be 
effective, in the government responses to the Niger Delta insurgency. 
1. A Hypothetical Model for Niger Delta Counter-Insurgency 
What would an effective counter-insurgency strategy in the Niger Delta look like? 
In seeking to eliminate an insurgent force from operating in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian 
government would have to implement a coordinated economic and political reform 
package in conjunction with military operations. The ultimate end state desired would be 
the relief of conditions that create popular support for an insurgent force, the separation 
of the insurgent force from its popular support base, and the systematic elimination of the 
insurgents themselves. This is unquestionably a daunting list of requirements for the 
Nigerian government to adopt. Economic and political corruption remains rampant. After 
years of economic and political marginalization, the ethnic communities in the Niger 
Delta are distrustful of the government and many see supporting the insurgents as a 
means of potentially seeing a change in their conditions. Lastly the terrain in which the 
insurgents operate well suited for the execution of guerrilla operations. 
In seeking economic and political reform, the government would need to facilitate 
some agreement between all stakeholders concerned about what an equitable distribution 
of these resources would look like. In the minds of most ethnic communities where the 
insurgents find support, there is clearly an imbalance here. By addressing political 
corruption, lack of effective revenue distribution and development among the Niger Delta 
communities, lack of economic opportunities for these communities, and the failure of  
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multi-national oil corporations to hold themselves accountable for ecological damage, the 
Nigerian government would go a long way toward removing the source of grievances that 
fuel the insurgency. 
The systematic separation of the insurgents from their support base would 
dovetail off efforts made in the political and economic areas. Popular support for the 
federal government would grow as reforms were made and would be capitalized upon by 
efforts to marginalize and alienate the insurgents from their ethnic communities. Those 
communities that continued to be unsupportive of efforts to reduce support for the 
insurgents would either have to be closely monitored and interdicted or relocated 
altogether. In doing so, strong efforts would have to be made to compensate these 
populations for the hardships imposed by their forced removal. 
The systematic elimination of the insurgents would require the Nigerian military 
to implement a combination of direct and indirect approaches that put effective pressure 
on the insurgent groups. In doing so, the insurgency’s structure would be disrupted due to 
loss of support caused by the increased risk in taking part in insurgent activities, the 
killing and capturing of its leadership, and removal of sources of supply without which 
insurgent military operations could not be conducted. This would have to be implemented 
through a combined effort by military and civil authorities to target known or suspected 
groups in a way that didn’t lose popular support or increase sympathy for the insurgent 
movement. 
There is no question that a counter-insurgency operation in the Niger Delta would 
be difficult. The prosecution of such an operation would be costly in terms of both 
military and civilian casualties, not to mention the destabilizing effect on the region and 
country. It would most certainly not be a fast or easy operation. However, the Nigerian 
military would “most likely eventually win in an all-out war against the militants.”112 
However, that all-out war has not been embarked upon. On the contrary, though military  
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efforts at interdicting militants could be characterized as repressive, recent efforts have 
been largely aimed at reducing the militants’ impact on oil extraction, while allowing 
them to continue to operate in the Niger Delta. 
2. Nigerian Government Responses until 1998 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the predominantly military regimes acted with 
“directness and swiftness” to any perceived challenges to their authority.113 As will be 
seen in the next chapter, the same approach was applied by the autocratic regime of 
Suharto. Like the Indonesians in Aceh, these responses always stopped short of 
addressing the root causes of the challenges. Furthermore, as long as the actions taken by 
the ethnically delimited civil action groups and militias did not threaten the flow of oil, 
they were viewed as harmless and generally ignored. This laxness was not the case in 
Aceh, where even minor agitations led to swift government reprisals. This allowed the 
ethnic militias to remain as a part of the Niger Delta landscape where they alternated 
between communal security apparatuses, helping police to apprehend suspected 
criminals, and low level criminal activities aimed at improving the economic standings of 
the militia members and their communities. Ironically, these militias were both vigilante 
and criminal elements at the same time. 
Beginning during the Babangida regime (1985-1993), the Nigerian government 
began to augment security forces employed by the multi-national oil corporations with 
Nigerian police (Mobile Police Forces—MPF) and military elements. This measure was 
taken in response to increasing communal agitation aimed at the oil companies. In 1987 
and again in 1990, these security forces were used to violently suppress demonstrations in 
Akwa Ibom and Rivers states.114 In both instances, tear gas and gunfire were used to 
disperse the crowds that had assembled outside of Shell oil company facilities. Numerous 
deaths were incurred on the part of the communal protestors. The demonstrations were 
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deemed to be dangerous by the Shell oil company due to the presence of ‘armed youths’ 
that threatened the safety of the oil company staff and infrastructure.115 
The Nigerian government’s response to the Ogoni uprising of the late 1980s is 
probably the most well-known and documented example the military government’s 
approach of reducing communal activism and militancy to criminality.116 Although 
MOSOP consistently claimed to use non-violent means of protest, the intimidation felt by 
Shell resulted in a government crackdown on the organization. In 1993, the Rivers State 
Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) was formed to help suppress MOSOP.117 The 
formation of this unit followed on the heels of the May 1993 Treason and Treasonable 
Offense Decree which was imposed by General Babangida as a means of dealing with 
“ethnic autonomy” movements.118 The RSISTF, led by an active duty major from the 
Nigerian Army, used highly repressive tactics in an effort to break up MOSOP. In 1994, 
following the mob killings of four Ogoni leaders from a splinter faction of MOSOP that 
opposed the tactics of the rest of the organization, sixteen MOSOP leaders including 
activist leader Ken Saro-Wiwa were arrested on murder charges. Convicted as murderers, 
nine of these activists were sentenced to death by the Abacha regime (1993-1998) and 
executed in 1995. In doing so, the criminalization of the MOSOP leaders was the key to 
movement’s suppression. 
The year 1998 saw yet another act of communal agitation that elicited a strong 
response aimed at restoring security in the face of “public disorder.” In a manner similar 
to the approach taken by the Ogoni, the Ijaw communities of the Niger Delta converged 
on the town of Kaiama in Bayelsa State (Isaac Boro’s hometown) to issue demands from 
the central government. The Kaiama Declaration of December 11, 1998 saw 5000 ethnic 
Ijaw youths from 500 communities, 40 clans, and 25 organizations coming together under 
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the auspices of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC).119 The IYC declared that all oil on Ijaw 
land belonged to them and further demanded that both the oil companies and Nigerian 
military withdraw from Ijaw land. The Nigerian Federal government approached this 
action in the same manner as it did the actions taken by MOSOP— crackdown. Declaring 
that the Federal Military Government was “determined not to allow anarchy to reign in 
the Niger Delta, “ then head of state General Abubakar ordered a massive military 
deployment to the Niger Delta during the first weeks of 1999.120 Although the 
militarization of the Niger Delta had started during the Babangida regime, the increase in 
ethnic communal agitations, particularly amongst the youth militias during the latter 
1990s, resulted in a strong military and police presence aimed at curbing militant 
activities while safeguarding the oil infrastructure. Little would change in the years 
following democratization.  
Although numerous, government sponsored committees were established to 
examine the growing agitation in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian government did not 
implement the recommendations made by these committees. From the Niger Delta 
Development Board (NDDB) of 1962 that sought to advise the federal government of 
how best to alleviate poverty in the region,121 to the Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Fund (OMPADEC) of 1989 which helped raise the amount of oil revenues 
going to the region from 1.5 to 3 percent,122 to the Niger Delta Environmental Survey 
(NDES) of the mid 1990s which sought to provide a means for the ethnic minority 
communities of the Niger Delta to voice their concerns,123 none resulted in a change in  
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the tactics taken by the Nigerian government to addressing the issue of ethnic militancy. 
Overwhelmingly, those tactics remained aimed at securing the oil infrastructure against 
the “criminal elements” of the Niger Delta.   
3. Nigerian Government Responses 1998 to 2005 
Tactics used by the Nigerian Government following democratization reflected a 
subtle change in approach. Although the use of military and police crackdowns continued 
in the midst of efforts to safeguard the security of the oil companies, the Obasanjo regime 
also sought to deal more directly with some of the militant elements in the Niger Delta. 
However, this effort to open dialogue followed the federal outlawing of such groups. By 
doing so, the Obasanjo regime opened political space for itself to both address the 
problems in the region directly with the militant groups while still being able to clamp 
down if required. 
Following the lead up to the 1999 elections, during which time the ethnic militias 
grew in strength and organization, and the secessionist rhetoric issued by the Ijaw Youth 
Council with the Kaiama Declaration, the Nigerian government began to recognize that 
the problem of ethnic militancy in the Niger Delta was growing much worse than 
previously recognized. Five months before handing over power to a newly elected 
Olusegun Obasanjo, General Abubakar was quoted as saying that “the agitation is not 
something that has come just overnight.”124 However, he went on to say that “the 
government in Abuja would not allow youth associations to challenge the authority of the 
state.”125 
The 1999 and 2003 interethnic fighting between Ijaw, Itsekiri, Ilaje, and Urhobu 
ethnic groups over the relocation of government offices and the “perceptions of oil 
company favoritism” resulted in the deployment of federal troops to suppress the 
violence.126 Hundreds died as a result of the intervention, which also involved the re- 
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capture of oil installations seized by the militants. An estimated 40 percent of the oil 
industry was shut down for several weeks during the 2003 uprising with significant 
damage being done to oil extraction infrastructure.127 By addressing the lawlessness of 
the inter-ethnic fighting with in intervention of their own military, the Nigerian 
government was safeguarding its own oil revenues from the inter-ethnic fighting between 
these “criminal elements”.   
In October 1999, a group of Ijaw youths captured and murdered a group of seven 
Yoruba police officers from the city of Lagos. These youths, members of the “Egbesu 
Boys,” an Ijaw militia , then took refuge in the Ijaw town of Odi. Following the killing of 
the policemen, an act that received universal condemnation by the surrounding 
communities and citizens of Odi, President Obasanjo issued an ultimatum to Bayelsa 
State Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha that required the perpetrators to be turned over 
to Nigerian Federal authorities within fourteen days for prosecution. In November 1999, 
two days after the deadline passed, the Nigerian Army proceeded with Operation Hakuri 
II with the aim of “protecting lives and property – particularly oil platforms, flow 
stations, operating rig terminals and pipelines, refineries, and power installations in the 
Niger Delta”.128 The end result was the complete destruction of the town and the killing 
of a large number of the town’s inhabitants.129 Following the Odi Massacre, a 
presidential spokesman suggested that the heavy-handed response by the Nigerian troops 
was a “successful model of intervention”130 aimed at preventing “criminal elements”  
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from being able to operate with impunity. For his part, President Obasanjo claimed, “the 
deployment of soldiers to Odi was done… to maintain law and order and save lives and 
property.”131 
In December 1999, President Obasanjo issued a blanket ban on all ethnic militias 
in the country.132 This act differed from the decree issued by General Babangida in that it 
specifically targeted the ethnic militias. The rationale for doing this was a need to put a 
stop to the proliferation of these groups that occurred without any regulation by the state 
or local governments, not to mention communal leaders. This action was aimed at not 
only curbing inter-ethnic violence, but bringing the control of law and order back into the 
hands of the government. In doing so, all ethnic militias throughout the country were 
outlawed thereby opening the way for criminalization to be better systematized as a 
means of dealing with the militia members. It is worth reminding the reader that prior to 
this time, the Nigerian government had given tacit approval for ethnic militias to be used 
to backstop the police in their pursuit of criminals. Now, branded a “brigands, ruffians, 
and thugs” by the government and many media sources, the militias themselves were the 
criminals. In 2002, the Nigerian Government formally ratified Obasanjo’s ban with the 
Prohibition of Certain Associations Act, which banned “associations or individuals or 
quasi-military groups” formed “for the purpose of… ethnic, tribal, cultural, or other 
social interests of a group.”133  
Following the extensive deployment of forces to the Niger Delta in 1999, the 
Nigerian military became more integrated in Nigerian government efforts to maintain law 
and order in the Niger Delta. In 2003, the Joint Task Force (JTF), codenamed “Operation 
Restore Hope” was formed. The formation of the JTF was a significant departure from 
previous efforts to control Niger Delta agitations in that it signified a permanent and 
much more highly organized security apparatus than had been previously in place. 
Headquartered at Warri in Delta State, the JTF maintains approximately 4000 Army and 
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Navy personnel at various locations in the Niger Delta with the mission of curtailing 
petroleum theft and safeguarding oil facilities and personnel.134 Using helicopters and 
gunboats to patrol the inland waterways and naval vessels to safeguard offshore 
infrastructure, the aim of curtailing oil theft met with success. By the end of 2004, oil 
theft, piracy, and vandalism of oil infrastructure was on the decline.135 The U.S. Navy is 
increasingly involved in assisting with maritime security and helping the Nigerian Navy 
to interdict militant activity on the open ocean.136 However, due to the lack of effort to 
eradicate the militias, militant activities continued. 
In addition to the judicial and security efforts implemented by the Nigerian 
Government to counter the militias, the government actually opened limited dialogues 
with some of the Niger Delta militants. Between mid-2003 and late 2004, two rival Ijaw 
militias led by Asari Dokubo and Ateke Tom engaged in a protracted turf battle around 
the Rivers State capital of Port Harcourt.137 This conflict had a strong destabilizing effect 
on the oil industry but the task of suppressing the intra-ethnic fight exceeded the scope of 
the JTF’s mandate while being overwhelming to local police. As such in October 2004, 
despite significant criticism from the military who stated that his actions legitimized 
militant actions, President Obasanjo met with the “rascally” leaders of both groups in 
Abuja in order to seek an ending of the conflict.138 In both cases, the militia leaders were 
granted amnesty from arrest. Following a meeting during which Obasanjo pledged to 
“crush them” if they didn’t accept, an agreement that included the “disbandment and 
disarmament of all militia groups” was agreed upon.139 The militias were to receive 
payment for all weapons they turned in to federal authorities.140 Asari continued his 
agitations following his return to the Niger Delta and was ultimately arrested for treason  
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in 2005. He remains in Abuja where he awaits trial for his criminal charges. His release 
from custody is one of the continuing demands that MEND levies on the Nigerian 
Government. Again, criminalizing the threat is used as a means to reduce it.  
Like the military regimes before it, the Obasanjo government launched several 
legislative initiatives in an effort to address the problem of resource control. In 2002, the 
Special Committee on Oil Producing Areas, a “government constituted panel of Nigerian 
military officers and police chiefs, international oil company executives, and senior 
government officials” was convened to examine how to best address the problem.141 
Recommendations from this committee included sweeping reforms aimed at both 
providing greater access to revenues and developing the area. However, little progress 
has been made in adopting the committee’s proposals. Implementing these 
recommendations would require the repealing of legislation that distributes the oil wealth 
to the rest of the country. Influential politicians from the northern part of the country, 
who are from the historically dominant ethnic groups of the Hausa and Fulani, carefully 
guard this legislation.142 As long as the northern ethnic groups maintain a powerful hold 
on the government, hopes are slim that this legislation will change.  
4. Nigerian Government Responses 2005 to Present  
The rise of MEND and other umbrella organizations in the Niger Delta has not 
caused a significant change in perception or tactics being implemented by the Nigerian 
Government. Still focused on oil theft and the militant activities associated with it as a 
form of rampant criminality, little credence is given to the insurgent organization. No 
direct negotiations have taken place between Nigerian Government officials and MEND 
leaders. Although the Nigerian government does not discount the agitation and 
restiveness that is growing in the Niger Delta, the perspective adopted by the Abuja  
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government sees the seemingly coalescing insurgent activities as nothing more than 
criminality aimed at gaining money and power for the militia groups and their 
supporters.143  
In February 2005, the JTF attacked five Ijaw villages in what a JTF spokesman 
claimed was an operation aimed at interdicting oil smuggling.144 During the course of 
this operation, both ground attack and aerial bombardment were used in an effort to 
destroy several oil bunkering barges that were sighted at the villages. Enraged Ijaw 
youths engaged the federal troops, resulting in an estimated 15 dead and numerous 
wounded. The JTF spokesman indicated that the actions of these youth indicated their 
complicity in criminal activities.145 Following these attacks, each of the communities 
requested MEND to support them in their efforts to combat the JTF. 
Brigadier General Alfred Ilogho, the Nigerian commander of the Joint Task 
Force, the Nigerian government’s joint military police agency charged with safeguarding 
the Niger Delta, claims that umbrella organizations such as MEND are nothing more than 
criminal fronts. “Anyone can sit down in his bedroom, concoct a name and send out 
several e-mails across the globe” Ilogho says of MEND’s supposed spokesman Jomo 
Gbomo.146 Although limited efforts are made to patrol the Niger Delta’s complex system 
of waterways, these patrols are focused in areas where oil production is taking place and 
are aimed at both preventing attacks by insurgents on oil facilities and interdicting 
petroleum theft. Interviews conducted with four Nigerian officers by the author at the Jaji 
Infantry Training Corps Center in November 2006 revealed that the Nigerian military’s 
perception of their mission in the Niger Delta is to interdict criminal elements who seek 
to steal oil and kidnap oil workers for ransom. 147 All of the officers interviewed, who 
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comprised two colonels, one lieutenant colonel, and one major, had served in the Niger 
Delta as part of the JTF. None of the officers stated that an insurgency is ongoing—
instead each of them stated that the problem revolves around criminal youth elements that 
are stealing oil and participating in piracy.  
E. SUMMARY 
Defending and attempting to deter attacks against oil facilities, coupled with 
occasional crackdowns on ethnic communities, does not constitute a counter-insurgency 
effort, if the aim of the government is to neutralize the insurgent elements. Yet an 
insurgency does exist in the Niger Delta, one that is stripping the government of 
resources and compromising the internal security of the state. Criminality is widely 
recognized as one of the first tactics used to provide “start-up capital” for an insurgency. 
Instead of seeking to remove the source of support for the insurgency (the ethnic 
populations) or striving to meet the demands of the ethnically delimited insurgent groups, 
the Nigerian Federal Government has chosen a tactic of safeguarding its assets while 
further marginalizing the insurgents from the population through the process of 
criminalization. What enables the government to do this is the lack of cohesion on the 
part of the insurgents that prevents them from causing intolerable economic damage or 
becoming a nationalistic cause that threatens the cohesion of the country. What prevents 
that nationalism is the ethnically diverse nature of the insurgent elements. 
Despite the strong rhetoric coming from the Niger Delta militias, it is highly 
questionable whether they possess the level of coordination necessary to bring petroleum 
production in the Niger Delta to halt.148 There is little question that even un-coordinated 
militias would constitute a “serious multi-pronged security threat,”149 but the fact that the 
nature of Nigeria’s ethnic politics and communal competition for resources prevents them  
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from coalescing into a single unified threat means that Nigeria does not have to address 
them as a threat to state cohesion. For now the militias are simply costly nuisances that 
Abuja can keep on a low simmer. 
Why the Nigerian Federal Government does not do more for the Niger Delta 
communities is a question that exceeds the scope of this thesis. The bottom line is that as 
of now, they do not have to. As long as the ethnic cleavages that prevent the militias from 
forming a single unified insurgent threat still exist, the ethnic communities of the Niger 
Delta will not constitute a threat serious enough to jeopardize the government’s power in 
Abuja or provide a credible threat of separatism. The militia members can simply be 
branded as criminals and, due to the inter-ethnic and in some cases intra-ethnic rivalry, 
hunted and brought in to custody or driven into the swamps. Either way, their activities 
can be minimized or curtailed. 
The real danger for the Nigerian Government lies in the potential for the ethnic 
minorities of the Niger Delta to bridge the existing ethnic and generational/class gaps to 
form a pan-ethnic or even single Niger Delta ethnic identity born out of the shared 
struggle of the communities against the central government. The appearance of pan-
ethnic civil groups in the Niger Delta points to the growing willingness of communities to 
come together in the face of perceived hardships.150 As Fearon and Laitin have argued, 
violence and social deprivation are powerful catalysts for the creation of new social and 
even ethnic identity.151 If a new Niger Delta ethnic identity were to form, Nigeria would 
potentially face an alarming problem as the communities of the region united in a 
separatist bid for a solution to their economic problems. These issues will be analyzed at 
length in Chapter IV. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, the communities of Aceh Indonesia were 
united by their shared hardships fighting perceived external threats. The result was a 
hardened homogeneous ethnic identity that provided a means for mobilizing a large  
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portion of the local populace around a nationalistic idea of separatism. This resulted in a 
threat that the state could not ignore and created an internal security situation that the 
Indonesian Government had few options outside of classic counter-insurgency to address. 
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Figure 2.   Map of Aceh152 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to the Niger Delta, the insurgency that wracked the province of Aceh 
in Indonesia until August 2005, represents a conflict wherein elements of an ethnically 
homogeneous community competed with the central government for control of revenues 
derived from natural resources and for an end to the ethnic disenfranchisement in their 
communities. Following the discovery of oil and natural gas in 1971, the province saw 
the development of a separatist movement aimed at establishing an independent, 
sovereign country. Although the factors that had led to an ethnic separatist movement are 
complex and multi-fold, the desire for control over Aceh’s natural resources is both a 
leading and enabling cause that made separation from Indonesia a possibility. 
The province of Aceh is situated on the northwestern portion of Sumatra in the 
Indonesian archipelago (See Figure 2). Comprised of the districts of Aceh Selatan, Aceh 
Singkil, Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Timur, Gayo Lues, Aceh Tamiang, Aceh Tengah, Aceh 
Barat Daya, Aceh Utara, Pidie, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Bireuen, and Nagan 
Raya, the province covers an area greater than 96,500 square miles and is located some 
1050 miles from Indonesia’s capital of Jakarta. It is geographically isolated and has long 
been an area difficult for outsiders to control. According to World Bank and Indonesian 
Government statistics, 69% of Aceh is covered by rain forest, with the coastal areas 
giving way to coastal swamps and mangrove forests, ideal terrain for the prosecution of 
an insurgency.153  
With a population of 4.4 million (roughly 2 percent of the country’s total 
population of 240 million), the Acehnese are widely viewed as ethnically 
homogeneous.154 Aceh is actually comprised of several linguistically distinct groups-  
 
 
                                                 
153 Leslie McCulloch, Aceh: Then and Now, (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2005), 10. 
154 Edward Aspinall, “Modernity, History, and Ethnicity: Indonesian and Acehnese Nationalism in 
Conflict” in Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia ed by Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling. (New 
York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 139. 
 53
suku155- with over 85-90% being linguistically and ethnically suku Aceh.156 The largest 
indigenous minority is that of the Gayo, comprising roughly 5% of the population.157 
Other suku include the Alas, Tamiang, Bulolehee, Singkil, Kluet, Anuek Jamee, and 
Simeulu.158 Throughout history, migrations from China and Southern India as well as 
importations by the Dutch have also come to Aceh, through mostly commercial dealings 
during the past 1000 years.159 In contrast with the Niger Delta, the suku inhabit well 
defined homelands that are geographically separate from other suku, though they actively 
interact with other groups. These minority groups have largely been integrated in the 
larger Acehnese population through Islam, subordination by the Acehnese sultanate, 
socio-economic ties, and shared deprivation.160 This differs with the Niger Delta where, 
though they now share the same kind of deprivation, the ethnic groups have long histories 
of competing with one another that remain salient today. The last minority group, 
comprising the largest overall minority, is Javanese; this group comprises the latest 
addition and is the least ethnically integrated due to contemporary political problems with 
the Government of Indonesia on Java.  
Though several of these groups speak different languages and have different 
cultural traits, their identities have coalesced and they all now consider themselves 
Acehnese. The main exception are the Javanese who were imported through deliberate 
efforts to both relieve overcrowding on Java, as well as a desire to “Indonesianize” areas 
outside of Java.161 Of particular relevance to this thesis, is the fact that the ethnic 
construct used by the separatist movement for what it means to be ethnically Acehnese is 
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that a person must be from a family that is from the territory of Aceh, be a Muslim, and 
be from one of the nine suku that comprise Aceh’s population.162 
The economic mainstay for Aceh’s indigenous population is mainly farming, 
forestry, and fishing. Up to 80% of the population is dependent upon subsistence 
agriculture.163 Coffee farming in the Gayo Highlands is a notably profitable form of 
commercial agriculture, but most agriculture is at the subsistence level. Although Aceh 
had historically been a major trading center in the 17th and 18th centuries, this role 
withered through the course of the 19th century. However, Aceh holds abundant natural 
resources, including large natural gas reserves, oil, timber, and mineral deposits. The 
advent of petroleum production in the mid-1970s brought new possibilities for economic 
growth for the province. A large, consolidated industrial complex was built at 
Lhokseumawe along the northeastern coast, which incorporated not only petroleum and 
petrochemical production, but also timber processing and fertilizer production.164 Aceh 
had become the engine of primary resource revenue for Indonesia. 
Today, despite the fact that it produces a third of the natural resource revenues 
that fuel Indonesia’s gross domestic product, Aceh is an impoverished area with many of 
the same infrastructure problems evident in the Niger Delta.165 Medical services, schools, 
clean drinking water, serviceable roads, and electricity are limited throughout much of 
the province. After the initial construction efforts at Lhokseumawe (ZILS) were 
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to the practice of importing skilled labor from outside of the province.166 Instead of 
seeing poverty decrease, it actually grew by an estimated 239% between 1980 and 
2002.167  
Between 1976 and 2005, the economic conditions in Aceh resulted in an 
ethnically delimited insurgency whose aim was the secession of Aceh from the state of 
Indonesia. Although the reasons for the emergence of the Free Aceh Movement or 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) included resentment aimed at Jakarta for harsh policies 
and the desire to establish an Islamic state, these motivations were really means for elite 
mobilization of greater popular support. It was only after the discovery of petroleum that 
GAM first appeared. Although GAM’s founding leader Hasan di Tiro cited divine 
inspiration as the reason for the timing of GAM’s emergence, the fact that he had 
personally lost out on a lucrative petroleum contract bid in Aceh just prior to launching 
GAM, as well as early rhetoric that focuses on control of Aceh’s resources, makes this 
claim suspect.168 Although ideology clearly played an important role in providing a 
platform for mass-level mobilization by elites, the underlying reason can be attributed to 
control of resources.169 
Unlike the Niger Delta where ethnic diversity has seemingly prevented the 
insurgency from developing beyond what the Nigerian government calls “criminal 
enterprises” into a separatist threat, the insurgency in Aceh presented a significant 
territorial challenge that the Indonesian government had to address through both military 
and political means. GAM proved to be a tough, cohesive opponent that derived wide 
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popular support from the Acehnese population. Although the economic grievances that 
led to the unrest are similar between the two country’s insurgencies, the means of 
mobilizing support are different. Understanding how the leadership of GAM mobilized 
the insurgency in Aceh to a level that required counterinsurgency operations and a 
negotiated settlement on the part of the Government of Indonesia requires an examination 
of Aceh’s history as a mobilizing agent for ethnic resource competition through 
separatism.  
B. HISTORY AND ACEHNESE SELF-PERCEPTION 
Aceh has long been a hotspot of conflict and unrest. Since before the beginning of 
the Acehnese Sultanate in the sixteenth century, warfare and communal rivalries were 
commonplace.170 This was due in large part to the positioning of Aceh along one of the 
oldest and busiest trade routes in the world. However, the rise of the Acehnese sultanate, 
which existed in varying degrees of effectiveness from 1514 until 1873, and the onset of 
the Dutch-Aceh War, provides among the most important sources of Acehnese 
independence-mindedness. The sultanate of Aceh, which reached the zenith of its power 
from 1607-1636, was at one time a powerful commercial empire in the region, with the 
heartland of the empire being centered along the northeastern coast of the province.171 
Touting a sophisticated history that includes successful resistance against European 
colonial powers, as well as an alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the people of Aceh 
view their history as a sovereign state as a significant component of their self-perception. 
This history of both glory and resistance has provided a powerful touchstone through 
which Acehnese elites rally support. 
The short-lived “golden age” of the Acehnese Sultanate provided the foundation 
of the Acehnese self-perception as the “Serambi Mekkah” or “Verandah of Mecca.”172 
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During this period, the Sultanate’s most celebrated leader, Iskandar Muda, implemented a 
legal system in Aceh based upon shari’a law. This Acehnese system was at variance in 
several ways with Qur’anic injunctions and incorporated local traditional practices known 
as hukum adat.173 In some ways the Acehnese system imposed harsher punishments than 
those required by shari’a. This helped to create a perception among the Acehnese that 
they were more devout than other Islamic communities in the region and helped fuse the 
second important source of Acehnese independence— Islam itself. 
Islam has been an integral part of the Acehnese self-perception for over 700 years, 
with the first direct evidence of a Muslim presence in Aceh coming from Muslim 
tombstones dating to the twelfth century on the eastern coast of Aceh. As a cultural 
system, Islam has provided the Acehnese with a powerful mobilizing agent that has 
created a potent level of cohesion in the Acehnese population.174 While the glories of the 
Acehnese Sultanate have faded to only memory, the relevance and mobilizing power of 
Islam has remained potent. 
The final component of Aceh’s history that provides a vehicle for mobilization 
relates directly to the two aforementioned factors of previous sovereignty and Islam, is 
Aceh’s violent struggle for self-determination. Beginning with the Dutch-Aceh War of 
1873-1913, extending through the fight for Indonesian independence from 1945-1949, 
and ending with the Darul Islam rebellion of 1953-1962, Aceh is an area that has 
seemingly witnessed long periods of unrest and violence. During the Dutch-Aceh War 
alone, an estimated 70,000 Acehnese lost their lives.175 Although the Acehnese fought 
alongside the Javanese for Indonesian independence, their actions did not necessarily 
reflect strong support for Indonesia so much as a desire to get rid of the Dutch. When it 
became apparent that the vision of an Islamic state that the Acehnese ulama176 had hoped 
                                                 
173 Riddell, 43. 
174 Clifford Geertz’s “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Reader in Comparative Religion, 4th Edition 
ed. by William Lessa et al., (London: Tavistock Publications, 1979), 79. 
175 Teuku Ibrahim Alfian, “Aceh and the Holy War,” in Verandah of Violence ed by Anthony Reid. 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006), 111. 
176 Ulama are Moslem scholars and community leaders who have long held political influence in 
Aceh.  
 58
for would not be realized in Indonesia, the Acehnese joined the Javanese-led rebellion in 
an effort to push that vision toward fruition. The end result of these conflicts has been a 
solidifying of the Acehnese ethnic identity through the shared hardships that the 
population faced. This problem of ethnic hardening was further exacerbated from the 
1970s to mid-1990s as a result of Government of Indonesia policies and the manner in 
which the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) or Indonesian Defense Force conducted 
counter-insurgency operations in an effort to combat GAM.  
These three components of Acehnese social identity combined with the economic 
grievances form the means by which the leadership of GAM derived support from the 
population in their push for the creation of an independent Aceh. The militias and 
community leaders of the Niger Delta use similar means to mobilize support from their 
own ethnic communities. The difference in Aceh is that the greater ethnic homogeneity of 
the population and long history of struggle for a common vision of self-determination 
allowed a unity of effort to develop that is absent in the ethnically pluralistic Niger Delta. 
C. GERAKAN ACEH MERDEKA 
First emerging in October 1976, GAM consisted of only 70 guerrilla fighters from 
suku Aceh. The insurgency centered in the northern and eastern parts of the province 
where Indonesian economic development was taking place.177 This area is inhabited by 
predominantly suku Aceh and enabled GAM’s leadership to capitalize on the 
commonality of ethno-linguistic traits to build a support base. During this early part of 
the first phase of the insurgency, GAM was comprised of mostly educated intellectuals, 
led by Hasan Di Tiro, the descendent of a prominent ulama family and grandson of a 
notable figure in the Dutch-Aceh War.178 Di Tiro had previously served as member of the 
Indonesian delegation to the United Nations until defecting to the side of the rebels in the 
Darul Islam (DI) uprising of the 1950s. In supporting the DI rebellion, he appointed  
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himself as Darul Islam “ambassador” to the UN until the rebellion was concluded.179 
Thereafter, Di Tiro remained in New York, going into business for himself until the year 
he decided to form GAM.  
Initially known as the Aceh-Merdeka (AM),180 the separatist movement did not 
deviate from its intended goal of removing the perceived Javanese colonial yoke from 
Aceh until a negotiated settlement was reached in 2005. Claiming that Indonesia is not a 
natural entity to which Aceh agreed to be a part, Di Tiro and his fellow GAM leaders had 
concluded that the outcome of the 1945-1949 war for Indonesian independence should 
have seen Aceh reverting to the sovereign status that was stripped from it in 1873.181 
Control of Aceh’s abundant natural resources has always been a rallying cry and has 
included comparisons between Aceh and the oil-rich Brunei Darussalam,182 as well as Di 
Tiro’s claim that he desires to “take control of Aceh’s wealth in natural gas which he 
argued ‘exceeds the property of Kuwait’ and use it to bring development to Aceh’s 
people.”183 
The evolution of GAM can be broken down into two fairly distinct phases. The 
first phase took place between 1976 and 1998 and was distinguished by the insurgency 
movement seeking to muster popular support in the face of a brutal military campaign 
that suppressed the movement and effectively prevented it from spreading outside the 
northern and eastern districts. Essentially in survival mode, the ethnic homogeneity of the 
movement combined with both economic deprivation and military repression aimed at 
the Acehnese population enabled the movement’s leaders to keep the embers of 
insurgency alive. The second phase began in 1998 with the advent of democratization in 
Indonesia and lasted through the conclusion of the conflict. This phase was characterized  
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by an increase in popular support for the insurgency which saw the movement’s numbers 
increase while simultaneously seeing popularity for the movement growing in areas that 
were not exclusively comprised of suku Aceh.  
1. GAM During the New Order Regime 
From its inception, GAM was comprised of a military wing and civilian 
government. The civilian administrative structures were modeled after GAM’s 
interpretation of the governing structures that existed during the time of the Sultanate. 
This “parallel” government was created to provide a separate governing identity for Aceh 
that would provide a means of galvanizing greater Acehnese support, replace the existing 
Government of Indonesia governing structures, provide a platform for negotiating with 
the Jakarta government, and provide a means for garnering international support.184 This 
civilian structure divided Aceh into administrative areas to facilitate control: province, 
district, sub-district, community, and village respectively. The GAM government sought 
to carry out such functions as tax collection and the issuance of marriage and birth 
certificates.185 This system took a longer time to mature than the military wing, but when 
it was effectively implemented after 1998, it created serious problems for Indonesian 
efforts to maintain control of the province.186  
GAM’s military strategy focused on five targets in Aceh-Indonesian security 
forces, the petroleum industry, ethnically Javanese migrants, the state education system, 
and Indonesian political structures.187 In adopting this military strategy, GAM’s aim was 
to weaken Jakarta’s hold on the province, creating a situation requiring greater levels of 
violence on the part of the security forces, thereby drawing more Acehnese to GAM  
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while compelling the international community to intervene.188 This strategy was 
rudimentary in the early years of the rebellion but, after receiving training in Libya 
during the 1980s, it was approached with much greater precision. 
Early efforts by GAM to expand their influence took place in areas that were 
ethnically homogeneous, that is coming from the same suku.189 This facilitated 
recruitment and enabled the movement to gain momentum. This is a point that requires 
emphasis. Throughout the first 26 years of the conflict, the insurgency was focused in 
areas that predominantly inhabited by suku Aceh. The majority of insurgent members 
shared the same ethno-linguistic background which defined GAM as an ethnically 
Acehnese group. It was only after 1999 that GAM’s success in expanding the territory 
under its control took the movement into areas that saw the ethnic diversification of the 
movement beyond suku Aceh. While this “dilution” of ethno-linguistic background did 
lead to some problems,190 the self-perception of all members of the insurgency was that 
of Acehnese. The poor economic conditions in Aceh combined with GAM’s criteria for 
what it meant to be Acehnese, enabled recruitment and maintained the ethnic 
homogeneity of the movement. 
Initially, GAM met with limited success in rallying popular support due to the 
secular nature of its message.191 According to Tim Kell, the key to gaining popular 
support in Aceh lay in the ulama. Although some were sympathetic to the idea of 
founding an independent Acehnese state, the lack of Islam in its ideology hindered an 
open endorsement by the religious leaders.192 The Declaration of Independence of Aceh-
Sumatra, released on December 4, 1976, made no mention of Islam but instead focused 
on the Javanese “colonial” efforts to subjugate the Acehnese people and steal “Aceh’s 
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natural wealth.193 This resulted in widespread sympathy for the movement but little in the 
way of actual support. By 1979, the movement’s leadership, having failed to rally an 
adequate popular base was on the run. Following an Indonesian counterinsurgency 
campaign, the majority of GAM’s leaders were dead, incarcerated, or exiled. Di Tiro fled 
to Sweden where he formed a government in exile.194 
In the intervening years between the time when GAM’s leadership had gone into 
exile and its reemergence in 1989, economic conditions in Aceh continued to deteriorate. 
GAM had been driven underground but was by no means dead. Not only did recruitment 
remain active, but also after 1986 Libya agreed to provide paramilitary training to new 
GAM recruits. Financial support continued from the Acehnese diaspora, which facilitated 
the purchasing of military equipment and limited weapons.195 During this period, 
recruitment expanded to incorporate more of the unemployed, uneducated, and otherwise 
disenfranchised.196 GAM continued to disseminate an ideology of separatism that not 
only incorporated the condemnation of Javanese resource exploitation, but also included 
the vilification of the TNI and Javanese migrants as enemies of the Acehnese people.197 
For their part, Di Tiro and his fellow GAM leaders remained abroad in Sweden, 
untouchable by the Indonesian government, but very much in touch with affairs on the 
ground in Aceh. The political hierarchy remained intact, with GAM’s political cells and 
field commanders in Aceh looking for and responding to guidance from their exiled 
Acehnese government.  
GAM re-emerged in 1989 and, despite significant pressure from the TNI, 
remained a potent and viable ethnically-based insurgency. When it remerged in 1989, 
GAM’s popularity had risen due to TNI abuses in the pursuance of the insurgency’s 
suppression, as well as the continued economic disenfranchisement of the population. 
Attacks aimed at military, political, and civilian targets became more serious. Using a 
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strategy that included guerrilla warfare, the infiltration of GAM loyalists into existing 
government structures, and attempts at political negotiation with both the Government of 
Indonesia and international actors, GAM sought to make Aceh ungovernable while 
bringing international support to their cause.198  
GAM leaders were able to establish insurgent areas of operation by capitalizing 
on the lack of civil authority in rural areas.199 GAM was further able to garner support 
through dissenting members of the Indonesian armed forces who actually supported the 
movement. The insurgents were able to operate in many of these rural areas with virtual 
impunity, recruiting more members and taking increasingly bolder military actions 
against government agencies. Popular support from a wide range of sources within 
Acehnese society grew quickly and without the apparent knowledge of Indonesian 
government and military leaders who were responsible for overseeing the province.200 
The result was that by 1989, the movement had become a significant problem, seeming to 
come from out of nowhere to challenge the authority of the Indonesian government. 
The ensuing crack-down by the TNI was brutal but effective. Although GAM was 
accused of atrocities, the scope and range of brutality inflicted on the Acehnese populace 
was far greater at the hands of the Indonesian military. By 1993, the insurgency had been 
effectively suppressed again with GAM members going into hiding or fleeing the country 
to neighboring Malaysia. However the harsh methods used by the TNI to achieve this 
result served to instill further outrage in the Acehnese community. The Acehnese came to 
see themselves as not only suffering economic marginalization at the hands of Jakarta, 
but also victimization at the hands of the military. Estimates vary, but most indicate that 
several thousand Acehnese civilians were killed by the TNI between 1989 and 1993, in 
an effort by the TNI to separate the movement from their popular support. Acehnese 
human rights groups would later find eleven mass graves containing up to 1,600 corpses 
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of Acehnese civilians and GAM suspects killed by the TNI.201 Although the movement 
would cease to effectively function by 1993, the outrage had led to a hardening of 
Acehnese sentiments that would simmer and eventually burst into a major popular 
uprising following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998.  
2. GAM in the Post-Suharto Period 
The year 1998 signified the end of the first phase of the GAM insurgency. After 
that year, Indonesian political liberalization, which included the significant reduction in 
numbers of TNI deployed to Aceh, enabled GAM to both increase the scope of its 
influence in Aceh as well as bring an international dimension to the conflict. With the 
collapse of the Suharto regime and an end to the oppressive military campaign that the 
government had implemented to suppress GAM, the ethnic independence movement saw 
its popularity expand greatly.202 This was caused not only by the continuing economic 
disenfranchisement and TNI abuses of the Acehnese population, but also by the UN 
supervised referendum in East Timor that led to the separation of that province from 
Indonesia. GAM now had a model to follow, as well as a boost in motivation that helped 
them to believe that a sovereign Aceh might actually be possible.203 This led to an 
increase in efforts to internationalize the conflict and an intensification of GAM’s 
military strategy aimed at undermining the Indonesian government in Aceh. This phase 
of the conflict was characterized by a sharp increase in the scale and intensity of violence 
in Aceh. By mid-1999, GAM controlled more of Aceh than ever before and the conflict 
intensified as more Acehnese rallied to the cause of national sovereignty. 
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By 2000, GAM had achieved its goal of internationalization with the first in a 
series of direct negotiations with the Government of Indonesia, hosted by an international 
non-governmental organization (NGO).204 GAM “saw negotiations as an opportunity to 
expose internationally the abuses that were taking place in Aceh.”205 However, the seeds 
of distrust in the TNI that had been sown in GAM and the Acehnese population resulted 
in little effort being made toward reaching a compromise. The differences between GAM 
and the Government of Indonesia had become intractable—although resource access lay 
at the heart of their grievances, systematic abuse by the TNI over the course of the 
previous twenty plus years had created such a level of distrust that GAM was unwilling 
to relent on its demands for independence. Through the course of three organized cease 
fires, and despite offers of special autonomy, that would have granted access to 70% of 
natural resource revenues, GAM remained resolute in its demand for full 
independence.206 Capitalizing on its growing popularity, GAM redoubled its recruiting 
efforts and sought to intensify the viciousness of the conflict, in the hopes of provoking 
international intervention.   
This resolution would only change following a protracted TNI counterinsurgency 
campaign in 2003-2004, and the catastrophic devastation of the 26 December 2004 
tsunami.207 Despite both of these setbacks to the insurgency, Acehnese ethnic cohesion 
remained strong. In actuality, the tactics used by the TNI in many cases only served to 
solidify that cohesion. In August 2005, GAM agreed to the terms laid out in the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Free Aceh Movement. This was done to allow for the unimpeded flow of much 
needed aid to the devastated province that had lost so much on account of the tsunami. 
Although failing in its aims of achieving Acehnese independence, in agreeing to the 
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terms outlined in this document, GAM had succeeded in not only guaranteeing an 
unconstrained 70% access of the province’s natural resource wealth to the Acehnese 
people, but also set itself on the path toward becoming a viable political party in Aceh’s 
political framework.208 This would be an acceptable path to self determination that had 
not previously been available. 
D. INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO GAM 
Although GAM used Acehnese ethnic homogeneity to build popular support, the 
Indonesian Government did not adopt a response that directly sought to counter this 
ethnic variable. Although the Indonesian importation of migrants and certain military 
tactics sought to drive cleavages into Acehnese popular unity, the main point that makes 
the Indonesian response to Aceh differ from the Nigerian response to the Niger Delta is 
that the Indonesian Government had no other choice than to conduct counter-insurgency 
operations aimed at destroying GAM. Criminalizing the problem would not yield the 
same results as it does in the Niger Delta. GAM had too strong of a support base due to 
the successful infusion of ethnic nationalism into the Acehnese population. However, 
analysis of the Indonesian Government responses to GAM provides interesting 
distinctions related to how ethnically homogenous insurgencies coalesce and the manner 
in which they can force a government to react. 
Government responses to GAM can largely be broken down into two periods that 
correspond with the phases of the insurgency. Those periods are the New Order period 
during which Suharto ruled Indonesia and the period following his fall from power. 
Interestingly, the former phase was a direct reason as to why the latter phase was 
different. The New Order period was characterized by a ruthless impunity on the part of 
the TNI that reflected their status in the Suharto regime. During his time as president, 
Suharto refused to negotiate with any of the separatist movements in the country. To do 
so would have legitimized them and their separatist causes. Instead, the TNI were 
allowed to operate in a manner virtually unconstrained by central government guidelines 
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with the aim of applying a military solution that would suppress the insurgencies. While 
these movements were mostly suppressed, they hardly disappeared and, moreover, were 
able to capitalize on enormous popular anger aimed at the government and military once 
reforms did take place. 
1. Counter-Insurgency under the New Order Government 
Since the beginning of GAM’s insurgency in 1976, the aim of the Government of 
Indonesia has been to crush the rebellion through counter-insurgency efforts while 
simultaneously safeguarding its economic interests in Aceh. The counter-insurgency 
tactics used by the TNI were characterized by the use of force aimed at separating GAM 
from their support base. “Shock therapy” tactics included the use of arbitrary arrest and 
detention, the restriction of civilian movement, forced re-locations of people from remote 
to more easily accessible areas, physical and sexual assault, and extra judicial killings.209 
The latter behaviors were particularly damaging to TNI credibility and effectiveness, 
failing completely to separate GAM from the rest of the Acehnese populace. TNI 
leadership, tending to view all Acehnese as potential collaborators, encouraged their 
troops to act with impunity. These actions inadvertently led to a stronger support base for 
GAM through the further hardening of the Acehnese ethnic identity. 
Operational tactics reflected a “blunt force” approach and included efforts by the 
TNI to use indigenous Acehnese against one another in an effort to identify, cordon, and 
even attack GAM elements. While not unique to combating ethnically delimited 
insurgencies, the tactics used by the TNI sought to separate GAM from its support base 
by first sowing communal discord. A tactic known as pagar betis or ‘fence of legs’ was 
frequently used in conducting cordon and search operations through GAM 
strongholds.210 This tactic required indigenous villagers to act as a clearing and cordon 
element in advance of TNI forces to flush GAM members out of areas in which they were 
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operating.211 Highly effective yet controversial, due to the risks and casualties sustained 
by non-combatant civilians, tactics such as pagar betis were successful in not only 
reducing the presence of GAM insurgents in particular areas, but also reducing ethnic 
cohesion due to the requirement for civilians to betray friends and even relatives. The 
latter effect was deliberate, but the eventually policy backfired, as the lasting impact was 
to spur the growing hatred and distrust of the TNI and Government of Indonesia among 
the residents of Aceh. 
Throughout the New Order period, the TNI deployed personnel to Aceh who were 
both ethnically different from the Acehnese as well as unaccustomed to the level of 
Acehnese devotion to Islam. In many cases this lack of preparedness for the depth of 
Acehnese Islamic devotion was compounded by either indifference or overtly hostility to 
their religious committment. This resulted in further cultural strains and alienation 
between the Acehnese and the military. Capitalized upon by GAM as further evidence of 
Aceh being subjected to a colonial occupation, the result was a hardening of the 
Acehnese ethnic identity that became all the more exclusive of outsiders. 
Military counterinsurgency tactics and lack of cultural empathy were not the only 
source of popular grievance with the Government of Indonesia. The policy of bringing 
migrant labor to Aceh was also damaging. This policy had begun in the 1950s and 
continued through the New Order period. Migrants were brought from Java as part of a 
government effort to not only provide economic opportunities and relieve over-
population problems for the Javanese, but also to “Indonesianize” the periphery of the 
archipelago. This policy was deliberately aimed at better homogenizing Indonesian 
society through the infusion of other ethnic groups into outlying communities. It was 
expected that the dilution of ethnic homogeneity would make it easier for Indonesian 
nationalism to take hold. However this policy, like pagar betis, also backfired. Most 
importantly, the policy created resource competition between the indigenous Acehnese 
and the imported Javanese. Imported Javanese had generally greater levels of training and 
were employed in the lucrative industrial sector at Lhokseumawe, thereby denying 
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employment opportunities to Acehnese.212 The result was to be the development of inter-
ethnic fighting between the two groups and another means for GAM to mobilize ethnic 
Acehnese to their cause.213 What did not appear to be accounted for was the manner in 
which this policy would marginalize the Acehnese thereby adding to their discontent. 
At no time during the New Order period were political negotiations between the 
exiled GAM leadership and Government of Indonesia conducted. This contrasts with the 
Niger Delta, where the Nigerian Federal Government sought to facilitate negotiations 
with ethnic insurgent leaders in an effort to reduce their impact on the country’s 
economy, though these insurgent leaders were still branded as criminals. As a result of 
Jakarta’s unwillingness to negotiate, the economic causes of the Aceh rebellion were 
never addressed and the perception of Javanese encroachment and exploitation only 
increased. The answer to the problem of Acehnese separatism was one that focused 
exclusively on military occupation resulting in an exceedingly traumatic period for the 
Acehnese populace; between 1000 and 3000 persons were killed and upwards of 1400 
‘disappeared.’214 Although GAM was suppressed, it was hardly extinguished. Sympathy 
for the movement and its message of independence became the lasting legacies of the 
New Order period. 
Interestingly, during the New Order period, the Indonesian government frequently 
refused to even acknowledge that it was conducting a counter-insurgency campaign in 
Aceh.215 The government instead claimed that the TNI had been deployed to interdict a 
“gang of peace disturbers” that were nothing more than a criminal element. Criminalizing 
the problem and denying the political aims of the people resisting them was a tactic that 
enabled the TNI to act with more impunity and conduct operations without regard for the 
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impact on civil-military relations. However, in reality the insurgency had moved beyond 
incipient criminality to a level of increased popular support. Furthermore, the government 
was conducting counterinsurgency operations aimed at eliminating the movement. This is 
interesting since it is similar to the rhetoric being used by Nigerian Federal Government 
facing the ethnic insurgency in the Niger Delta. The result has been a hardening of 
sentiments against the Nigerian Federal Government and their military forces. The same 
result also occurred in Aceh, but the means for mobilizing a unified, region-wide reaction 
was possible due to the ethnic unity of the Acehnese. 
2. Indonesian Government Responses to GAM after the New Order 
Indonesian responses to GAM after the New Order period reflected a requirement 
to deal with the effects of over two decades of repression against the Acehnese populace. 
Ethnic nationalism had hardened significantly over the course of this period. The unified 
ethnic perception of the Acehnese would have been a strong obstacle for the Indonesian 
government to overcome even if the tactics used by the TNI had not been so brutal. 
However, the damage had been done. Where at one time, the marginalization of the 
insurgency movement from the greater population or even the possibility of negotiations 
with GAM might have been possible, these were opportunities lost by the time the New 
Order regime ended. The government now faced an ethnically united community that was 
intractable in its opposition to the Indonesian presence. 
The year 1998 constituted a turning point in the Aceh conflict. Following this 
year, the conflict entered a new phase wherein the TNI was no longer able to operate with 
unobserved impunity. The Asian financial crisis and subsequent overthrow of Suharto 
had left Indonesia in an economically and socially fragile state. Both domestic and 
international communities demanded that the Government of Indonesia reform with 
particular emphasis on military reform. Whereas previously, the Indonesian military had 
been comprised of both the military and police forces (including the national paramilitary 
police — Brigade Mobil; BRIMOB), after 1998, the two were separated.216 This 
reformation set the stage for the greater professionalization of the TNI. This 
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professionalization would include the adoption of more refined counterinsurgency tactics 
that didn’t aim to alienate the Acehnese populace and further entrench ethnic opposition 
to the Indonesian presence in the province. 
The secession of East Timor in 1999 also impacted the government’s response to 
Aceh. In Aceh, the years of oppressive military tactics and potential for international 
intervention fueled resurgence in ethnic violence that the Government of Indonesia would 
require a change in tactics to counter. No longer could counter-insurgency only be about 
simple military suppression. Now the Government of Indonesia would have to directly 
deal with the Acehnese people and the separatist movement.  
As a result of international and domestic demands for liberalization, President B.J. 
Habibie ended the military occupation of Aceh in 1998.217 Following an apology for the 
trauma suffered by the Acehnese people by General Wiranto, Chief of the Indonesian 
Armed Forces, all TNI that were not home-stationed in the province were re-deployed.218 
However, an almost immediate escalation in violence occurred, aimed at the remaining 
TNI forces, Javanese transmigrants, and industrial infrastructure at Lhokseumawe. GAM, 
realizing that the military was on the political defensive, tapped into the years of 
collective Acehnese anger and frustration to successfully escalate the conflict.219  
As a result of this escalation, by January 1999 the government redeployed an 
estimated 2000 TNI were back to Aceh to initiate security operations.220 Owing to the 
weakening of the military’s stature due to their record human rights abuses, the nature of 
Indonesian military operations in Aceh changed. There was now a greater concern with 
creating the appearance that the military was subordinate to police in the maintenance of 
order. As such, instead of counter-insurgency by the TNI, the emphasis was placed on 
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security and law and order under the paramilitary police, Brigade Mobil (BRIMOB).221 
This was done in an attempt to lessen Acehnese anger at the TNI and Government of 
Indonesia. In reality however, significant numbers of TNI remained. The atrocities also 
continued; the BRIMOB were no more accountable for their actions than the TNI and, 
owing to BRIMOB’s military roots, the tactics used by both were similar. Both the 
security forces and GAM engaged in murder and violent criminal operations, in most 
cases to try to discredit the other while Aceh’s civilians remained in the middle. Despite 
Indonesian efforts to mitigate the problems between the military and Acehnese, the 
Acehnese ethnic identity continued to harden. 
With the escalation of the conflict and realization that a military solution alone 
would no longer work, the Government of Indonesia agreed to participate in formal 
negotiations with GAM. Indonesia’s Ambassador to the UN, Hassan Wirajuda met with 
Hasan Di Tiro in Geneva Switzerland on 27 January 2000.222 These talks led to the first 
in a series of cease-fires between the belligerent forces in May of that year. This cease-
fire is often referred to as the Humanitarian Pause and was implemented in an effort to 
establish common ground between the central government and the separatist movement. 
The hardened ethnic identity of the Acehnese and recognition by the Government of 
Indonesia that force alone wouldn’t work had given GAM the opportunity to engage in a 
dialogue that had not previously been possible. 
Before the Humanitarian Pause was even implemented, the Government of 
Indonesia had been preparing a comprehensive “special autonomy” law aimed at 
undermining popular Acehnese support for GAM, by addressing some of the Acehnese 
grievances.223 Much of the work done on this plan was performed by Acehnese leaders 
from the provincial government and was done with the aim of providing GAM with a 
venue through which it could end its insurrection.224 This law, which would become 
known as Law 18/2001, the Special Autonomy Law for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
                                                 
221 Aspinall and Crouch, 13-14. 
222 Ibid., 11. This first cease-fire became known as the Humanitarian Pause. 
223 Ibid., 14. 
224 Ibid., 16. 
 73
(NAD Law) was deliberated for several months by the Government of Indonesia before 
being passed into law. Like the legislative efforts at alleviating poverty in the Niger 
Delta, the NAD law was an effort to reduce popular anger against the government and 
thereby weaken support for the insurgency. 
By late February 2001, the Humanitarian Pause had broken down.225 Never fully 
implemented by either side, both belligerents blamed one another for the failure to 
maintain agreed upon terms. For their part, GAM claimed that the Government of 
Indonesia had not suspended operations. Furthermore, GAM remained committed to the 
idea of a separate sovereign Aceh. Senior elements of the TNI were opposed to 
negotiations, which they saw as a legitimizing the Acehnese insurrection. They therefore 
continued to conduct limited security operations, which invariably led to armed 
confrontations between TNI and GAM elements. The TNI claimed that GAM was using 
the cease-fire to recruit and re-equip. GAM was also accused of failing to cease insurgent 
operations, to include a serious breech— an attack by GAM on the natural gas production 
facilities operated by ExxonMobil.226 This caused the first-ever shutdown of ExxonMobil 
Operations in Aceh, resulting in an impact on the already struggling Indonesian 
economy— whereas MEND has only been able to threaten this kind of action in the 
Niger Delta, GAM was able to actually make it happen. This gas production shutdown 
provided a significant reason for to the re-initiation of new counter-insurgency operations 
in Aceh by President Abdurrahman Wahid in May 2001.227 
The Government of Indonesia seemed to hope that political liberalization and a 
reduction in military presence in Aceh would lead to a reduction in the insurgency, but 
the opposite occurred.228 Even with the opening of direct political negotiations between 
the Government of Indonesia and GAM in January 2000, the drive to achieve 
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independence only intensified. This can be attributed to the perception by GAM that it 
was making progress in the conflict, not only as evidenced by its growing popular 
support amongst the Acehnese, but also due to the advent of negotiations with the central 
government. GAM sought to further increase its support base by attacking Indonesian 
targets in the hopes of eliciting a harsh response by the TNI on the local populace. As a 
result of GAM’s intensification of the conflict, by April 2001, the Government of 
Indonesia began to re-focus on the military option and counter-insurgency as a means of 
keeping Aceh within its orbit while minimizing the economic impact of GAM. 
The first new counter-insurgency campaign was codenamed Operasi Pemulihan 
Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum (OKPH) or Operation for Restoring Security and 
Upholding the Law.229 The OKPH was executed by a TNI with a greater level of 
professionalization and sophistication and reflected more of a “classic” counter-
insurgency style.230 In addition to the police elements under whom operational control 
would rest, OKPH saw the return of unconventional warfare units including Kopassus.231 
Although ostensibly a police operation, by mid-2002 the number of military on the 
ground in Aceh actually outnumbered the police by more than two-to-one.232 The 
purpose of this operation was to reduce the overall strength of the insurgency movement 
and shrink the territorial control of GAM through a combination of pressure on GAM’s 
military arm, while simultaneously drawing more Acehnese away from the movement 
through the economic incentives of the soon-to-be ratified NAD Law.233 Additionally, 
the Government of Indonesia sought to leverage GAM into resuming the stalled peace 
talks while setting the conditions for the implementation of special autonomy.234 In 
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effect, Jakarta sought to soften Acehnese economic grievances that had enabled the 
Acehnese ethnic identity to become so hardened against the Indonesians. This would 
thereby weaken popular support for GAM. 
On August 9 2001, newly elected President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed the 
long awaited NAD legislation into law. This unilateral action by Jakarta to bait GAM into 
accepting conditions that would end the conflict provided several concessions that GAM 
had sought. Granting the Acehnese “unprecedented powers of self-governance and 
control over natural resources,”235 this plan allowed the Acehnese to retain 80% of 
petroleum and natural gas revenues (as opposed to 15% in other provinces with the 
exception of Papua) and provided Aceh with the right to implement shari’a law and 
govern themselves more in accordance with Islamic norms.236 However, the continued 
presence of security forces in Aceh caused GAM to see this as a plan to undermine them 
while affording the TNI with the continued ability to inflict harm on the Acehnese people 
and further siphon off Acehnese resources.237 Furthermore, GAM was specifically 
excluded from participating in the political processes of Aceh.238 GAM denounced the 
law and continued their calls for independence, much in the same way that MEND has 
denounced Nigerian legislation. The OKPH operation continued. 
The OKPH operation resulted in some significant progress for the Government of 
Indonesia. The GAM Commander in Chief in Aceh, Abdullah Syafi’i was killed in 
January 2002 and several other lower level GAM commanders were also eliminated 
during this time. In addition to targeting leadership using an inside-out approach, the TNI 
employed an outside-in approach that targeted GAM members of all ranks. Those GAM 
members captured were frequently subjected to “re-education” aimed at replacing ideas  
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of Acehnese nationalism with those of Indonesian nationalism. Furthermore, vocational 
skills training were provided in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the 
disenfranchised elements of Aceh’s population.239  
However, the OKPH operations were ultimately unsuccessful in quelling the 
insurgency due to the failure to effectively integrate the military operations between TNI 
and police elements. Atrocities still occurred, many of which were perpetrated by GAM 
members themselves on their fellow Acehnese in an effort to keep hardened ethnic 
sentiments intact. Furthermore, OKPH operations were conducted in a manner 
disconnected from an overarching political strategy. Although the NAD legislation was 
passed while OKPH operations were ongoing, little effort was made to effectively link 
the military and political elements in a manner that put effective pressure on GAM.240 
This potential economic incentive failed to be capitalized upon in a manner that might 
have reduced Acehnese anger at the government. While the efforts at political and 
military integration were significantly better than previous operations, GAM’s resiliency, 
capitalizing on their ability to translate years of repression into ethnic animosity against 
the “Javanese occupiers,” enabled the movement to continue in strength. However, the 
lessons learned by the TNI and Indonesian Government were significant and applied to 
good effect the following year.  
Although GAM did not accept the NAD law as a sufficient enticement to suspend 
hostilities, the Government of Indonesia nonetheless viewed their “generous” concessions 
as a means to separate the insurgency from their base of support. By continuing to apply 
military pressure on the insurgency, it was expected that the insurgents would eventually 
“accept reality” and re-engage in negotiations with the Government of Indonesia. After 
internationalizing the talks through the recruitment of a team of “wise men”241 of  
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significant international stature, an enticement that the Government of Indonesia knew 
would be appealing to GAM, peace talks resumed in February 2002 in Geneva 
Switzerland.242 
This latest round of negotiations began haltingly. Although GAM representatives 
stated that the NAD law provided a “starting point” for negotiations, they continued to 
claim that no action short of independence would be acceptable.243 These statements led 
to frustration on the side of the Government of Indonesia and an intensification of 
military action in Aceh. Government leaders gave GAM until the end of the month of 
Ramadan (December 6, 2002), to continue serious negotiations before resorting to “the 
intensification of operations to restore security and the unity of the Indonesian state.”244 
In an effort to soften GAM’s stance, arrangements were made for a group of Acehnese 
civil society leaders, including prominent ulama, to meet with the GAM leadership. 
According to the civil leaders, it was the Acehnese themselves who were suffering the 
most from GAM’s intractable position; if GAM was perceived as obstructing a peace 
agreement, the loss of popular support would likely follow.245 This was a calculated 
move on the part of Jakarta to make GAM believe that its popular support was 
weakening. Ultimately the level of ethnically derived popular support for GAM had 
grown too strong and this move by Jakarta was seen for what it was.   
On December 9, 2002, following further international interest that spurred GAM 
to concede to negotiations, the Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement (COHA) 
was signed.246 This respite from the violence was short-lived however. Due to issues 
largely stemming from the requirement to demilitarize, compounded by perceived 
violations of the ceasefire agreement, and differences in agreement on how to conduct 
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elections, the COHA began to unravel within weeks of it being signed. Furthermore, 
residual anger amongst the Acehnese and ethnic animosities against the Javanese 
migrants still remained. Talks resumed in April 2003 in an effort to salvage the 
deteriorating situation. However, this time the government had hardened its position. 
Demanding that GAM fully accept the tenets of special autonomy as outlined in the NAD 
law, together with the requirement that GAM demobilize its military force, the 
Government of Indonesia gave GAM no room for further negotiation. This was in 
essence a demand for GAM to surrender. The talks collapsed and President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri signed a military emergency declaration in May 2003, declaring martial law 
in Aceh. Although the decision had been made for a primarily military solution in Aceh, 
confidential negotiations continued.247  
By May 18, 2003 TNI and police strength in Aceh had been reinforced to levels 
not seen since during the New Order period. Military strength had increased to 30,000 
with police augmentees numbering 12,000.248 On May 19, 2003 Operasi Terpadu 
(Integrated Operation) was officially launched. This operation was the most 
comprehensive counter-insurgency effort undertaken by the Government of Indonesia in 
their efforts to eradicate GAM and the largest military operation launched by the TNI 
since the 1975 invasion of East Timor. Over the course of the next year and a half, the 
Indonesian government would implement a campaign to overcome Acehnese ethnic 
separatism through a combination of economic and political incentives combined with a 
massive, albeit more professional, effort to subdue the insurgency. 
Operasi Terpadu marked the culmination of Government of Indonesia’s efforts to 
subdue GAM. Including a four part approach to bringing order to Aceh, Operasi Terpadu 
sought to make up for some of the tactical and operational shortcomings of the OKPH 
operation. These included greater efforts by the TNI to establish a cordon around Aceh to 
seal off GAM from logistical re-supply, as well as a greater focus on occupying areas that 
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had been cleared of insurgents.249 Many of the same tactics and procedures used in the 
preceding counter-insurgency campaign were used during Operasi Terpadu. Overall, the 
scope of the operation was much larger and more thorough than OKPH operation. 
Operasi Terpadu implemented both direct and indirect approaches that saw the TNI 
conducting military operations to eradicate GAM, law enforcement operations to reduce 
the economy of conflict that had taken hold over the course of the conflict, humanitarian 
aid that focused on winning the hearts and minds of the Acehnese populace, and the 
restoration of local governance through direct military oversight.250  
Military operations included extensive cordon and sweep operations that 
effectively pushed GAM away from population centers. Unlike previous attempts at 
using indigenous forces to push GAM into the hinterland, Operasi Terpadu made 
exclusive use of police and military personnel. No militias or indigenous persons were 
forcibly employed in operations as had been done during the New Order years. This had 
the effect of minimizing the impact on Acehnese civilians thereby minimizing further 
ethnic animosity against the Javanese migrants and TNI. Although Acehnese militias 
were formed, they were employed as local security elements, akin to a neighborhood 
watch program. Using indigenous personnel as intelligence sources and employing 
extensive patrolling to locate GAM strongholds, the TNI systematically hunted the 
insurgents during Operasi Terpadu, resulting in an estimated kill/capture rate greater than 
the pre-operation estimates of GAM’s size.251 
Several of the coercive methods that had long been employed in Aceh remained. 
The TNI continued to use terror tactics to instill fear in the Acehnese population as a 
means to isolate GAM. Although military actions tended to be more precise in their 
targeting of GAM personnel, the practice of random killings still remained. During 
Operasi Terpadu, the TNI specifically targeted the families of GAM members in order to 
garner information through surveillance and physical manipulation as well as an effort to 
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leverage the GAM members to cease their actions. This resulted in many of the families 
of GAM members being subjected to disenfranchisement on the part of their 
communities. In several cases, GAM family members were killed or disappeared.252 
The TNI also sought to replace the growing Acehnese nationalism with support 
for the Indonesian state. During the period when martial law was in effect, the TNI 
organized rallies and ceremonies where Acehnese citizens were compelled to swear 
allegiance to the Indonesian state. These actions were designed to enforce loyalty to the 
Indonesian state while distancing the participants from GAM and the notion of Acehnese 
independence. Although many officials boasted of a growing sense of Indonesian 
nationalism in Aceh, most academic sources dismiss these actions as coerced and not 
sincere on the part of the recipients of this treatment. These efforts at overcoming ethnic 
nationalism were almost universally viewed as unsuccessful, and only further served to 
alienate the Acehnese. 
From the political side, the TNI moved quickly to assert their influence and 
authority over local Acehnese governance. Officials suspected of maintaining ties with 
GAM or even looking the other way on insurgent activities, were invariably replaced by 
TNI. This was particularly the case at the village level where local governance had 
ceased to function.253 The parallel government was systematically tracked and 
dismantled, resulting in both a drop in revenue for the movement as well a reduction in 
social support. With the parallel government disintegrating, the movement was reduced 
to guerrilla actions, which were increasingly difficult outside of the rural areas. Although 
ethnic animosities and Acehnese nationalism may have remained in the populace, the 
ability to express them was muted.  
At the national level, particularly after President Megawati’s term in office 
expired, secret negotiations continued with GAM in an effort to maintain some kind of 
dialogue. Newly elected Indonesian Vice President Yusuf Kalla doggedly pursued a  
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means to re-establish meaningful discourse with the exiled leadership in Sweden. Even 
before the devastating tsunami of December 26, 2004, peace talks were already being 
planned.254  
3. Final Political Settlement 
Few contest that the imposition of martial law and Operasi Terpadu significantly 
impacted the ability of GAM to operate in Aceh. GAM had seen its numbers suffer 
serious attrition and the reduction in compulsory participation by indigenous Acehnese in 
TNI counterinsurgency efforts prevented further ethnic alienation. The parallel 
government had been dismantled and “services” offered by the GAM political wing were 
disrupted. There is no question that GAM had been driven to the hinterland, suffered 
heavy casualties, and been separated from its base of support. However, the true extent of 
the damage inflicted on the ethnic insurgency remains a matter of conjecture. The 
overwhelming impact of the tsunami fundamentally altered the social, political, and 
military landscape of Aceh, making it difficult to assess the level of damage inflicted on 
GAM. The Acehnese people and GAM ultimately had to subsume their struggle for a 
sovereign Aceh to the more immediate task of recovery from the effects of the tidal wave. 
The counterfactual question remains whether GAM would have been able to muster 
ethnic nationalism again as they did in 1989 and 1998 and return to insurgent activities. 
Following the tsunami, GAM declared an immediate, unilateral ceasefire. This 
gesture was not initially reciprocated by the TNI, but current President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono immediately sent a government negotiating team to Helsinki, Sweden to re-
initiate peace talks.255 This was an opportunity to extend the hand of goodwill from 
Jakarta in a manner that would reduce ethnic animosities and hard sentiments against 
Indonesian rule. In January 2005, less than a month after the tsunami, a new round of 
negotiations had begun between GAM and the Indonesian Government. Despite initial 
trepidations on the part of GAM’s leadership, these talks led to a negotiated end to 
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hostilities in Aceh that did not see the province seceding from the country. Ultimately, for 
the sake of rebuilding Aceh after the tsunami, both sides agreed to reach a resolution that 
would enable relief efforts to more effectively help the stricken province. The 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Indonesia and the Free 
Aceh Movement (MOU) was signed on August 15, 2005, effectively bringing an end to 
the Aceh Conflict.  
As of today the process of demobilizing GAM and establishing an autonomous 
Aceh continues. Indications appear favorable that the MOU reached on August 15, 2005 
will remain in effect. Elections were held in Aceh on December 11, 2006 and saw GAM 
participating not as an insurgent spoiler but as a budding political party.256 Contrary to 
what many expected, the election saw the GAM candidates for provincial governor win 
by an overwhelming margin (38.2%) as well as carrying strong showings in areas that 
were not even ethnically suku Aceh.257 The Acehnese ethnic identity that had supported 
the insurgency through almost thirty years of conflict now succeeded in bringing GAM to 
power. With GAM now positioned as the rising governing elites for the province with 
significantly greater control over their natural resource wealth, the former insurgents have 
seemingly struck a deal with Jakarta that will see them operating within the governing 
framework of an autonomous Aceh under the sovereign control of Indonesia.  
E. SUMMARY 
The ethnic homogeneity of Aceh was a variable that significantly impacted the 
course of the conflict from both the side of the insurgency as well as the government. In 
the case of GAM, the leadership succeeded in capitalizing on the relative homogeneity 
and shared historical experience of the populace in the province to develop a nationalist 
drive for independence that was effective. With a population facing severe economic 
degradation and marginalization, inter-ethnic competition from an imported source, and 
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systematic abuses by what were portrayed as an occupying military force, manipulating 
common ethnic heritage was not difficult. Those ethnic minorities, who were not part of 
the 85-90% suku Aceh majority, could still be mobilized in the nationalist drive for 
independence by manipulating the mobilizing power of Aceh’s history as a former 
sovereign entity and the unifying ties of Acehnese Islam. From these vehicles of 
communal mobilization, a nationalistic appeal and separatist movement was able to grow 
and thrive. 
Although the rhetoric used by GAM’s leadership employed several means to 
mobilize popular support, this conflict was ultimately about resource access. Had Aceh 
not been so economically deprived in the face of such rich natural resource holdings, it is 
questionable whether an insurgency would ever have arisen there. History, lingustic 
commonality, and shared culture do not provide strong mobilizing agents unless there is 
material benefit to be gained. Ultimately, it was the fact that so many of Aceh’s 
indigenous inhabitants were ethnically from the same stock and shared a common history 
that GAM’s leaders, as ethnic entrepreneurs, were able to manipulate a large enough 
number of the masses to mount a drive for independence.  
Jakarta on the other hand was impacted by Acehnese ethnic homogeneity through 
the ability of GAM to form a separatist movement ideologically supported by ethnic 
nationalism. This ethnic nationalism led Jakarta to having no other option than to pursue 
a counter-insurgency program aimed at reducing support for GAM while systematically 
seeking to destroy its insurgent members. Interestingly, by using brutal military tactics 
aimed at instilling fear in the populace as a means of separating the insurgents from their 
support base, while importing Javanese migrants in an effort to dilute the Acehnese 
population, the indigenous population only grew more cohesive and supported the 
insurgency. Ultimately, the Government of Indonesia had to take a comprehensive 
approach that incorporated military actions with political and economic concessions into 
an integrated counter-insurgency plan that would reduce ethnic tensions, address the root 
causes of the insurgency, and keep the province within Indonesia’s territorial control. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN INSURGENCY DEVELOPMENT 
In seeking to analyze how governments address insurgencies where ethnic 
composition is a critical component to how those insurgencies organize, it is perhaps best 
to start by analyzing the factors that influence the ethnic hetero- or homogeneity of the 
communities in which the insurgencies formed. In the cases of the Niger Delta and Aceh, 
the ethnic compositions of the regions are actually similar. Both have ethnic groups that 
comprise a majority, with several smaller ethnic groups living in the same region. The 
Ijaw comprise the dominant ethnic group in the Niger Delta, while the suku Aceh 
comprise the dominant ethnic group in Aceh. Both regions share similar histories of 
oppression and encroachment by outside influences; the British and other African ethnic 
groups in the case of the Niger Delta, and several European colonial powers and the 
Indonesians in the case of Aceh. Yet one region sees continued ethnic fragmentation 
while the other region was able to coalesce to form an ethnically-based bid for 
separatism. Why was Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) able to unite and mobilize Aceh 
under a cause of ethnic nationalism, while the Niger Delta militias have not? The answer 
to this question lies in four factors.  
First, the Niger Delta has always been a hotbed of ethnic competition with few 
unifying variables bringing the ethnic communities together. Linguistic and cultural 
differences have remained pronounced and salient. Although some groups share common 
cultural and religious features others, most notably the Ijaw with their god Egbesu, are 
exclusive. From pre-colonial days of the slave trade through the period of the palm oil 
trade, the ethnic communities in the Niger Delta have competed with each other, 
sometimes even at the intra-ethnic level. Today, the potentially unifying variable of 
economic deprivation is relatively new. Development has never taken place in the Niger 
Delta, and it is only within the last several decades that the ecological impact of oil 
extraction combined with the perceived imbalance in revenue distribution by the central 
government, and degenerating nature of the Nigerian economy has truly become an issue 
for the local communities. At the local level, the engrained patterns of inter-ethnic 
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competition have remained active. It has only been in the last 15-20 years that some 
measure of success has been achieved in establishing pan-ethnic groups that can clamor 
for their rights. Until 1999, those groups were largely suppressed by a distant military 
government. As such, the Niger Delta communities have had a shorter amount of time 
than Aceh to see pan-ethnic movements or newly constructed ethnic identities take root. 
By comparison, Aceh has a long, shared history of unity under the Acehnese 
sultanate. The strength and importance of this history should not be discounted. The level 
of devotion to Islam, particularly the form of Islam practiced in Aceh, and the permeation 
of the socio-political components of that religion is enduring and powerful. The different 
suku unified under Islam that comprise the Acehnese population have a long history of 
living and working together spanning hundreds of years. Moreover, these same 
communities have a long history of shared hardship at the hands of outsiders. Starting in 
1873, they have essentially been in conflict with “colonizing powers” for their rights of 
self-determination. These factors made the development of ethnic nationalism by Hasan 
di Tiro, inclusive of all suku, something that the ethnic entrepreneur could accomplish.  
The second is the nature of the political systems in the two regions. In the case of 
the Niger Delta, politics is inextricably tied to ethnicity and patrimonial client systems. 
Politicians in the Niger Delta tend to seek access to political power for the furtherance of 
their respective ethnic group’s agendas.258 At the local and community levels, this again 
can even transcend ethnic ties, which results in intra-ethnic competition. The result is that 
a single unified political force that can rally support for an insurgency has difficulty 
taking root. Although some politicians in the Niger Delta may even support insurgent 
groups, the impact of ethnicity on politics there means that the insurgent groups 
themselves have little by way of reliable political backing beyond a local level and are 
unable to unify behind a single agenda, much less a separatist movement. 
In contrast, ethnic politics in Aceh lacks this dynamic of zero-sum competition. 
Different ethnic minorities are accustomed to commercial and political interactions 
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patrimonial governance. 
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between their leaders in a manner that, while aimed at bettering their constituents, is not 
done in a manner that impedes the progress of the groups. In this environment of relative 
political harmony, GAM’s leadership was able to find support that grew as the level of 
economic stagnation worsened in the province. GAM’s leadership was able to start with 
the idea of separatism and have its attraction grow in appeal as the situation in Aceh grew 
worse.  
The third factor dovetails with the previous one and is the nature of how the 
insurgencies started. The insurgency in Aceh started as a unified idea for the 
establishment of an independent state, one that had actually existed previously as a 
sovereign entity. This idea of seeking independence preceded the existence of the militant 
elements and enabled Hasan di Tiro and his cadre to form an insurgent group with focus 
and direction where one had not previously existed.259 Furthermore, the movement 
started and was waged for the first 22 years in districts of Aceh where the population was 
almost exclusively suku Aceh. In contrast, the employment of militias in the Niger Delta 
for security and inter-ethnic competition had existed long before the problems of 
economic deprivation began. As previously discussed, these militias served the 
communities of which they were a part. This fact made it difficult for these groups to 
coalesce. This began to change, particularly amongst the Ijaw, by the late 1990s. 
However, as the 2003 Ijaw-Itsekiri fighting and 2004 turf war between Ijaw elements 
around Port Harcourt attests, there are still significant communal and ethnic divisions that 
have not been overcome. 
The final factor is the impact of the government actions themselves in their 
respective efforts to reduce the insurgencies. These actions will be examined further in 
this chapter.  
As such, these four factors created conditions that enabled GAM to mobilize an 
ethnically homogenous and unified insurgency effort that solely focused on loosening the 
political and economic grip of the Indonesian government on its region. Conversely, the 
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seek Aceh’s secession from Indonesia, but instead sought the implementation of Islamic government. 
 88
Niger Delta militias can only muster support at the level of single ethnic and communal 
groups, thereby preventing the insurgency from moving beyond the incipient stage of 
criminality. These different sets of conditions in turn affected the strategies that the 
insurgencies were able to employ, and the manner in which they were able to bring 
pressure to bear on their state governments.  
B. INSURGENT STRATEGIES COMPARED 
An examination of the military strategy employed by GAM relative to those of 
the Niger Delta militias is important for understanding how an ethnically homogeneous 
insurgent group poses a greater threat to a state government than an insurgency 
comprised of ethnically diverse elements. GAM was able to muster ethnic nationalism 
within the province aimed at driving out the Indonesian government and reestablishing 
the previously existing Acehnese sultanate. In contrast, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the other ethnic militias of the Niger Delta 
have only been able to issue demands for Nigerian withdrawal and amendments to 
current revenue disbursement policies, which are not backed by levels of force sufficient 
to require the government to deal with them. These threats have thus far not been 
significant enough to cause a change in the strategy of criminalization by the Nigerian 
government. This disparity in capability between the insurgencies is directly related to 
the level of ethnic cohesion each enjoys and has negative implications for the operational 
potential of the Niger Delta militias. Interestingly, with the exception of GAM’s targeting 
of the state education system, parallels can be observed in the operational targeting 
employed by both insurgencies. However, as will be shown, the reasons and desired end 
states of targeting these specific areas differ based on strategies available. 
The targeting of Indonesian security forces by GAM is similar to the actions taken 
by the ethnic militias in the Niger Delta, in that this is the targeting of “occupation 
forces” that are viewed as foreign, exploitative, and abusive of the respective ethnic 
communities. However, in the Niger Delta most of the military action taken against 
security forces is conducted in the furtherance of oil theft or attacks on oil infrastructure. 
Only recently have attacks on military targets by organizations such as MEND been 
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conducted for reasons not linked to petroleum theft, and these actions have been more the 
result of targets of opportunity than deliberate attacks. In Aceh, GAM targeted military 
and police personnel in a more deliberate and methodical manner to foment insecurity 
and demonstrate the inability of the Indonesian government to control the area.260 
Both insurgent groups actively target the petroleum industry in their areas. In 
Aceh, the LNG industry’s infrastructure and personnel are attacked for the same reasons 
that they’re attacked in the Niger Delta; the petro-industry is perceived as stealing 
resources without adequately compensating the local communities. Both perceive the oil 
companies to be “co-conspirators” with the state governments to deprive the communities 
of revenue. Although some of the Niger Delta militias state that they intend to shut down 
oil production, at this time they are incapable of doing so; most militant actions reflect a 
local focus that lack an effective level of coordination sufficient enough to critically 
impact the Nigerian government. Moreover, actions are not aimed at permanently 
crippling oil production thereby forcing the government to deal with the insurgents. Most 
actions are against petroleum personnel in the Niger Delta and include kidnappings with 
ransom demands for their release. As of this writing, no hostages have been killed by 
Niger Delta militia groups. At the high end of conflict, local militias seize oil facilities, 
but the Nigerian military quickly intercedes to evict them. With adequate financial 
payouts from the oil corporations, most of the Niger Delta communities have been 
willing to allow petroleum extraction to recommence.261  
This is not the case in Aceh where attacks against petroleum workers were more 
violent, and the shutdown of oil production was sought as a means of impacting the 
Indonesian economy. A GAM spokesman was quoted in 2002 as saying: “The general 
principle is that the government of the State of Aceh prohibits all activities that lead to 
the exploration of its natural resources by foreign powers, especially if such exploration 
is the source of revenue for the enemy Indonesia. The Hague and Geneva Laws recognize 
the right of warring parties to eliminate the economic facilities of the enemy that can be 
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used to strengthen the muscle of the military.”262 As previously mentioned, Exxon Mobil 
was forced to shut down all production and refining operations in Aceh in 2001, as a 
result of concern for the safety of its employees. GAM’s targeting of the oil industry was 
therefore part of an overarching strategy to push Jakarta toward allowing secession.   
Although direct inter-ethnic competition appears in both conflicts, the reasons for 
it taking place in the Niger Delta are fundamentally different from those in Aceh. 
Whereas inter-ethnic competition in the Niger Delta takes the form of ethnic communities 
competing for economic advantages (due to the adjustment of political boundaries, claims 
to distributed oil revenue, and the development funding), the ethnic competition in Aceh 
was aimed at the systematic removal of one ethnic group by another. In the case of Aceh, 
GAM sought to intimidate Javanese migrants into leaving the province, claiming that 
they were part of the “colonial legacy” of Indonesian occupation, as well as active 
collaborators with the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) against GAM.263  
This controversial effort at “ethnic cleansing” by GAM was not only designed to 
send a message to the Jakarta government, but also to mobilize support from the 
Acehnese population.264 In pursuing this strategy, GAM actively sought to intimidate 
ethnic Javanese through violence, extortion, and terror tactics. Between 2000 and 2002 
alone, an estimated 50,000 Javanese migrants had fled Aceh.265 Although efforts by 
different ethnic groups to forcibly evict another have taken place in the Niger Delta, these 
actions were not used as part of a larger strategy aimed at the Nigerian Federal 
Government. 
Militarily, GAM also sought to target local government structures in an effort to 
both cripple Jakarta’s influence in Aceh, and recruit as many politicians and civil servants 
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as possible into GAM’s parallel government. Any political or civil leader who levied 
criticism against GAM made him a target. Threats, kidnapping, and murder were all used 
to intimidate local government officials. These efforts were largely successful: In May 
2003 when martial law was declared in Aceh, “99 out of 228 districts and 4,750 out of 
5,947 villages did not have a functioning local government.”266 Furthermore, GAM 
spokesmen estimated that upwards of 70% of Acehnese citizens used the GAM 
government offices than those of the state.267  
In contrast, the targeting of political officials by ethnic militias in the Niger Delta 
has not caused a noticeable impact on the ability of state or local government agencies to 
function. Although ethnic militias actively target political officials for assassination, these 
actions are not done in an effort to undermine the central government. As noted in the 
previous chapter, ethnic militias principally fight for their ethnic communities and are 
regularly co-opted by political aspirants and incumbents, who are usually from the same 
ethnic group. These politicians frequently use the militias as “firepower” to intimidate 
their opposition, particularly during election periods. These actions reflect a larger 
“struggle for hegemonic positions” by political figures in their pursuit of access to better 
rent-seeking opportunities.268 In this environment, the ethnically delimited militias are 
prevented from constituting a political force of their own and do not threaten the Nigerian 
government. Even if an ethnic militia is able to muster enough support to operate 
autonomously of the local politicians, there will always be the threat of other militias, 
serving as quasi-armies for standing political leaders, who would most likely oppose 
them. 
C. ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
Understanding that the insurgencies in the Niger Delta and Aceh levied different 
kinds of challenges on the central governments, it becomes clear that Indonesia didn’t 
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have an option to conduct counter-insurgency. Nigeria on the other hand is losing oil 
revenue, but not in a sufficient quantity to threaten the government’s hold on power. 
Furthermore the government is not in danger of losing territory to a new sovereign state. 
For Indonesia, due to the goal of secession, and strategies used by GAM, it is unlikely 
that security operations and criminalizing the threat alone would have worked in Aceh. 
The safeguarding of Indonesia’s economic resources in the province would have resulted 
in a rise in negative popular sentiments that would have eventually threatened the 
economic interests themselves, not to mention the entrenchment of secessionist elements 
within Acehnese society. Unlike the Nigerian government in the Niger Delta, where 
resources can be safeguarded militarily while separatist potentials are limited by the 
inability of the ethnic groups to coalesce, the Government of Indonesia had no other 
choice than to address the threat through counter-insurgency or concede to allow the 
province a slow decline toward independence. Although the options for the two 
governments differed, there are still interesting similarities and divergences in the 
government strategies that merit examination and lead to some surprising implications. 
1. Similarities and Differences 
Despite the differences that the two governments took in approaching their 
insurgency problems, there are similarities in their strategies. Both sought to outlaw the 
movements; Suharto’s New Order regime outlawed GAM in 1977 and unleashed the TNI 
to doggedly pursue the movement until it was suppressed in 1982. In Nigeria, the military 
government outlawed subversive activities, while the Obasanjo government outlawed 
ethnic militias altogether. Both governments sought to strongpoint and safeguard the 
areas of economic importance to them in the regions, and implemented harsh reprisals on 
communities that were thought to be supporting or harboring insurgent elements. Last, 
both governments sought to implement legislative reforms that offered greater resource 
access to the communities as a means to reduce popular unrest. These actions failed to 
effectively quell the insurgencies and allowed the conditions that led to the restiveness to 




the opportunities and constraints imposed by their respective levels of ethnic 
homogeneity led to important differences in government response that are outlined 
hereafter. 
Although the similarities are important, it is through analysis of the differences in 
how the governments addressed the insurgencies that an understanding of how ethnic 
composition is important in insurgency and counter-insurgency can be determined. 
Unlike Nigeria, the Indonesian government deliberately imported another ethnic group in 
an effort to dilute the ethnic composition of the Acehnese population, while bringing in 
elements of Indonesian society that would hopefully instill loyalty to Jakarta. This plan 
resulted in the unintended consequence of providing a means for mobilizing support for 
GAM. While there is little question that this policy resulted in Jakarta gaining some loyal 
supporters in Aceh, particularly among the Javanese transplants, the negative effect 
clearly provided fuel for the GAM perspective of Indonesia as a colonizing power.  
However, had the Indonesian government not adopted this policy of 
transmigration, which had been in effect since the 1950s and produced two generations of 
Javanese transplants in Aceh that supported the government, it is probable that the 
Acehnese would have viewed the TNI and Jakarta-backed local government as even more 
of an intrusive element. The simple fact is that GAM managed to manipulate the presence 
of the Javanese migrants and present their presence in a manner that marginalized the 
group, before the intended effect of ethnic dilution had fully taken place.  
In contrast, the Nigerian government has made no effort to transplant large 
numbers of other ethnic groups into the Niger Delta. Not only is this practice not 
necessary given the diffuse nature of the existing ethnic composition of the region, but to 
do so would actually create an “external pathogen” that might cause the ethnic groups of 
the Niger Delta to coalesce. The antagonism that the hiring practices of multi-national oil 
corporations for their supernumerary police, wherein personnel from other ethnic 
communities are brought in to conduct security, provides a glimpse of that ethnic 
coalescing on a smaller scale. Leaving the ethnic communities to squabble amongst 
themselves for resource access in a manner similar to what they have done for hundreds 
of years actually serves to keep the homogenizing of a single ethnic identity from 
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occurring. Although the government does intervene in inter- and intra- ethnic conflicts in 
the Niger Delta, they usually only do so when the impact of that fighting affects oil 
production.  
Another important difference between the Indonesian and Nigerian approaches to 
their insurgencies is the fact that the TNI attempted to militarily destroy GAM. Unlike 
the Niger Delta where the military seeks to simply safeguard the resources, the TNI made 
a concerted effort, albeit in an unrefined manner during the first phase of government 
efforts, to eradicate the movement. This effort by the TNI saw terror tactics being used 
and deliberate attempts to engineer intra-communal conflict as a means to separate the 
insurgency from its popular support base. As a result of these TNI efforts, sentiments 
against the TNI and government of Indonesia, as well as Acehnese ethnic nationalism, 
only hardened. The fact that this took place in the absence of effective Indonesian 
government efforts to address the economic and political causes that led to the separatist 
movement in the first place only exacerbated the problem. The result was continuous 
pressure being felt by the Acehnese population, wherein the counter-insurgency measures 
taken by the TNI were actually part of the problem. This kept the seeds of insurgency 
alive and led to the insurgency worsening in the late 1990s. Had the Indonesian 
government employed efforts to alleviate poverty and economic decline in conjunction 
with those military measures, it is likely that the counter-insurgency measures taken by 
the TNI would not have been as damaging. 
Conversely, the Nigerian government does not seek to eradicate the insurgency 
through the use of the military or police. While the militias are outlawed, military and 
police operations in the Niger Delta are aimed at interdicting oil theft and smuggling, 
while safeguarding petroleum processing facilities and oil company cantonment areas. 
Military and police brutality has certainly taken place in the Niger Delta as the death toll 
of the Odi massacre attests; however, operations such as these are retaliatory in nature 
and do not reflect an effort to systematically hunt and destroy the insurgents. Where 
insurgents or militia elements are observed conducting operations, they are engaged. Yet 
there is little effort made to uncover their operating bases or systematically separate the 
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insurgents from the populations that support them. If communities are moved, it is to 
prevent them from interfering with petroleum extraction. 
Sustained terror tactics such as rape, torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial 
killings, for the purpose of reducing support for the insurgency, are not conducted by the 
military or police in the Niger Delta. Criminality of this nature is a feature of the region, 
particularly inter-ethnic violence, but it is not conducted or fomented by agents of the 
state government in the same deliberate manner that it was in Aceh. The TNI sought to 
use fear as a means to paralyze support for the insurgency. It failed and only created 
greater distrust for them by the Acehnese population. Additionally, operations that seek 
to employ indigenous communities against themselves for the purpose of betraying 
militia members are not conducted in the Niger Delta. If the government uses militias for 
anything, it is to fight one another for political gains though not to eliminate one another.  
Unlike in Aceh, the lack of these two tactics prevents sweeping and sustained 
damage to the Niger Delta communities, thereby limiting the level of anger and fear 
aimed at the government. This keeps the frustration and anger aimed at the Nigerian 
government focused on its failure to provide economic relief, not from the inflicting of 
atrocities on the population. Although the Nigerian military are loathed and feared, with 
the possible exception of the youth elements, the Niger Delta communities still support 
their local governments. This is unlike Aceh, where civil support for local governance 
broke down and shifted to support GAM’s parallel government, as a result of TNI abuses 
and frustration over perceived Jakarta collusion in the atrocities. 
D. SUMMARY 
The difference in levels of ethnic homogeneity and harmony between the 
Acehnese and Niger Delta communities resulted in different strategies and operational 
methods being employed by the main insurgent elements toward fundamentally different 
end states. In both cases, the insurgencies focused on inflicting severe enough damage to 
their state governments’ interests in the regions in which they operated, to result in the 
governments complying with the demands of the insurgent leaders. However, the ability 
of GAM to muster a separatist movement based upon ethnic nationalism resulted in a 
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different desired end state and correspondingly different means to achieve it— 
fundamentally undermining the Indonesian social, political, and economic presence in 
Aceh while seeking to raise the level of violence to a level that resulted in international 
intervention. 
In contrast, the militias of the Niger Delta, including MEND, were and remain 
unable to raise a unified effort. These militias face the added challenge of having to fight 
amongst themselves, principally for access to the same revenues that they demand from 
the state government, in addition to fighting the military and supernumerary police of the 
oil companies. These inter-ethnic rivalries divide their efforts and prevent any degree of 
operational synergy from taking place. This results in uncoordinated efforts to oust the 
Nigerian presence or force the government to concede more revenue.  
The actions of the Indonesian and Nigerian governments were also impacted by 
the level of ethnic homogeneity of the communities in their respective conflict areas of 
Aceh and the Niger Delta. The ethnic nationalism and resultant separatist bid by the 
Acehnese resulted in the Jakarta government having to seek to eliminate the insurgency. 
Furthermore, policies and tactics intended to divide the communities and separate the 
insurgent elements from them actually resulted in both ethnic and communal hardening 
due to the success of GAM in using both to their advantage. In the end, as Operasi 
Terpadu showed, the only option was an integrated counterinsurgency campaign that 
drove GAM away from the populace thus enabling the TNI to regain control of the 
territory, while still conducting negotiations with the insurgency’s leadership with the 
aim of ending the conflict.  
The Niger Delta’s ethnic heterogeneity and disunity result in the Nigerian 
government having another option. That is to simply protect the economic interests of the 
state and declare the insurgent elements to be criminals seeking to better themselves at 
the expense of other elements of Nigerian society. This enables the Nigerian government 
to both refuse to negotiate over the demands levied by the militias, while employing 
brutal tactics aimed at communities in collusion with “criminal elements.” This brutality 
is just enough to instill fear in the Niger Delta communities but stops short of pushing 
them toward the formation of a new ethnic identity born of state-inflicted violence. 
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Furthermore, keeping the region undeveloped and poor keeps the ethnically divided 
communities fighting over the limited economic opportunities that are available. In doing 
so, the Nigerian government successfully implements a divide and rule strategy using the 
communities’ own ethnic cleavages against them, thus avoiding the dilemma of how to 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT: FIGHTING SMART OR 
PROLONGING THE INEVITABLE?  
Is Nigeria fighting smart or simply avoiding an inevitable counter-insurgency? By 
not pursuing efforts to systemically destroy the insurgency, the government is avoiding 
the Indonesian dilemma that caused Aceh to become such a problem from 1998 through 
2005. By strong-pointing the petroleum production areas against “criminal elements” and 
identifying and treating the insurgency as “criminal enterprises,” the Nigerian 
government both justifies the presence of the military in the Niger Delta while providing 
a rationale for the limited military operations needed to safeguard oil production. 
Operation Restore Hope, as its name seems to imply, claims to be providing a positive 
presence in the Niger Delta aimed at reducing criminality. By attacking known or 
suspected oil bunkering sites, such as those Ijaw communities attacked in February 2005, 
the JTF claims to be deterring criminal activity which should open the way for greater 
economic opportunity in the region. Brigadier General Ilogho, Commanding General of 
the JTF, indicates that he has “adopted a strategy of dialogue” that seeks to reduce 
tensions between the communities and the government, while enabling his troops to 
conduct that mission.269 
However, unless changes are made in the way Nigeria approaches the economic 
malaise in the Niger Delta, the ethnically delimited communities there have few options 
outside of “criminality”. Unemployment remains high with few options for gaining 
income outside of oil bunkering, putting many of these communities on a trajectory that 
will inevitably see them engaged by the Nigerian military. Although Ilogho stated that the 
government seeks “long-standing solutions to the problems on the ground,”270 the 
poverty and environmental despoliation remains a severe problem. Although the JTF are 
not conducting counter-insurgency aimed at ridding the Niger Delta of ethnic militias, the 
efforts of the Nigerian military to interdict these communities’ few economic options has 
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the potential to have the same effect. Over time, the frustration at the Nigerian 
government for the lack of economic development may be coupled with resentment due 
to military interdiction in the communities’ only potential economic option to such a 
level that the communities begin to see one another as the same. When this occurs, ethnic 
markers that had previously been salient may begin to break down. The seeds of a new 
historical narrative could be emplaced enabling the leaders of movements like MEND to 
cross the ethnic divides that had previously been insurmountable, to coalesce a new 
ethnic identity in a bid for greater access to the Niger Delta’s resources.  
If the Nigerian government were to commence counter-insurgency operations 
now, it is likely that they would embark on a campaign that would see this ethnic 
coalescing accelerate. The Niger Delta’s exceedingly difficult terrain would necessitate 
measures to control the population within it. As outlined in the hypothetical model in 
Chapter II, one of the tasks the Nigerian military would have to undertake would be to 
separate the ethnic insurgents from their supporting populations. In doing so, the military 
would invariably have three options: destroy those communities; place occupation forces 
on the ground to monitor and interdict insurgent activities in those communities; or force 
migrate those communities out of the conflict area in order to deny the insurgents the 
ability to gain support.  
All of these options would create additional hardships that would potentially see 
previously separated communities coming together against the common external threat. 
Destroying the communities would clearly not be an option for reasons so obvious they 
need not be addressed. Occupation forces, even if managed in a highly refined manner, 
would still result in local resentment against an external occupier. If this resentment did 
not occur immediately, it would not take much for an insurgent group to instill it in a 
manner similar to the way that GAM did with the TNI in Aceh. This resentment might 
well lead to increased militant action aimed specifically at the occupation forces, thereby 
inviting further government reprisals. As the military clamp down continued, the saliency 
of ethnic boundaries might be reduced in the face of an external threat, thereby leading to 
a willingness of ethnic communities to band together. The worst case scenario for the 
government would be the coalescing of a new ethnic identity. From this increased 
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willingness to work together or new sense of ethnic identity might grow an ethnic 
nationalist movement that would be able to muster a significant separatist threat.  
Forced migration would result in displaced communities that would have to be 
dealt with in one of two ways. The first would be the creating of refugee camps outside of 
the conflict area, wherein displaced communities could be quarantined and monitored. 
The second would be the movement of displaced communities into areas already 
occupied by previously resident indigenous communities, potentially from another ethnic 
group, where they could be controlled and monitored. Either of these migration options 
would open the door for further ethnic coalescing or, at a minimum, pan-ethnic collusion, 
geared toward coordinated efforts to interdict the government’s policies. While 
engineered inter-ethnic competition or even forced efforts to “re-program” these 
populations to be loyal to the government, as was done in Aceh, might be put in place in 
an effort to forestall this ethnic coalescing, the forging of a new ethnic identity in the face 
of the governmental oppressor would be probable. Based on these factors, engaging in 
counter-insurgency without first implementing economic reforms in the Niger Delta is a 
recipe for a much greater problem.  
Economic reforms in the Niger Delta might translate into reducing corruption. If 
Nigeria succeeds in addressing the epidemic levels of corruption in the government that 
prevent petroleum revenues from being properly channeled toward development in the 
Niger Delta, the government will set the conditions to allow counter-insurgency to be 
adopted without risking the creation of a new ethnic identity that pushes the region 
toward secession. This is not to say that a purely military counter-insurgency strategy 
would be able to be adopted. Far from solely a military strategy, this strategy would seek 
to enable development to act as the catalyst for negating the reasons for insurgency. 
Where jobs, education, and infrastructure could be brought in, the grievances would be 
eliminated. With the grievances eliminated, the insurgents’ demands would be met. Any 
remaining “insurgent” elements would truly be criminals, and any state and civil actions 
to eliminate them, would gradually cease to have support and a viable means to operate.  
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B. MIGHT GAM BE A MODEL FOR MEND? 
Whether or not MEND or a similar umbrella organization in the Niger Delta 
might be able to use GAM as an effective model for insurgency is a question that this 
thesis does not seek to address. However, it will be touched on briefly here. As discussed 
the Niger Delta and Aceh bear some significant similarities. Although GAM failed to 
succeed in achieving independence for Aceh, they did succeed in securing access to 
greater resource wealth for the Acehnese people. This goal is similar to what groups like 
MEND claim to seek. Both regions have ethnic communities isolated from the rest of the 
country that were systematically disenfranchised by government policies. Both view the 
presence of the state government as oppressive and intrusive. Additionally, the trajectory 
of the Niger Delta insurgency’s development within the majority ethnic group of the 
region first, as was done in Aceh, appears to be taking place.  
However, whether MEND leaders can span the ethnic divides both within the 
Ijaw communities and the other ethnic groups remains unknown. The Ijaw comprise the 
largest of the ethnic communities in the Niger Delta, though as the 2003 to 2004 turf wars 
between rival Ijaw militias attests, there are divisions even within single ethnic groups. If 
the Ijaw were able to unite under a common purpose of opposing the Nigerian 
government, a critical first step toward ethnic coalescing would have taken place. Other 
ethnic groups might be convinced to join the insurgent effort under a unified Ijaw plan, 
either under the guise of a Niger Delta ethnic identity, or as a pan-ethnic effort geared 
toward achieving each ethnic groups’ ambitions.  
Several factors not considered during the course of this writing comprise areas for 
further research would have to be examined to determine if a separatist movement would 
be able to be effectively mounted by an insurgent group such as MEND. These factors 
include the impact of local government manipulations of ethnic militias relative to the 
ability of those ethnic militias to organize in a pan-ethnic manner. Nigerian neo-
patrimonial governance and its side effect — political and economic corruption — would 
also have to be factored in. Additionally, the growing divide between youths and 
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traditional elites, as well as the urban/rural bifurcation in Nigeria271 are factors that will 
likely need to be considered. Lastly, Nigeria as an ethnically plural society with other 
ethnic competition issues outside of the Niger Delta would also have to be considered.  
At a glance, based upon the state of current ethnic divisions in the Niger Delta, it 
is unlikely that a movement like GAM would be able to take hold. Based upon this 
conclusion, it is unlikely that the Nigerian Government will have to pursue an integrated 
counter-insurgency campaign any time soon. Continuing to criminalize the ethnic militias 
that steal oil, while managing the ethnic cleavages in the communities in such a way that 
they prevent the unification of a single ethnic identity capable of cultivating a sense of 
Niger Delta ethnic nationalism, appears to be an option whose only drawbacks are the 
continued discontent of communities, the hemorrhaging of potential oil revenue, and 
international disapproval mostly at the level of non-government organizations. However, 
it is probably safe to say that the criminalization course of action cannot be pursued 
indefinitely. Economic disenfranchisement is itself a potential mobilization path for a 
new Niger Delta ethnic identity that is capable of transcending the existing ethnic 
cleavages. If a charismatic and influential leader like Hasan di Tiro were to rise from 
within the Niger Delta with a convincing narrative for why the Niger Delta has always 
been and needs to be separate and distinct from Nigeria, the sustained economic 
marginalization coupled with the potential for shared perceptions of that marginalization 
by ethnic communities at the hands of a distant disinterested state government might be 
enough to push the region to attempt to secede. The Nigerian government would do well 
to seek political and economic reforms now so as to avoid such opportunities by ethnic 
entrepreneurs that might lead to another Biafra or situation similar to Aceh.  
If the government is to pursue a counter-insurgency course of action, it should 
ensure that the campaign is largely one focused on political and economic reform. As 
shown by the Indonesian experience in Aceh, military forces occupying the area being 
contested for resource control have a strongly polarizing effect in bringing ethnic 
communities together against an external threat. Failure to implement a counter-
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insurgency campaign that is mostly focused on reforms with military efforts focused on 
continuing to secure oil infrastructure while interdicting oil theft will likely result in the 
hastening of ethnic coalescing or pan-ethnic resistance that could evolve into a bid for 
separatism. While it is questionable whether such a movement would succeed in 
mustering sufficient support for seceding from Nigeria, the prospect of a coordinated 
insurgency conducted by a community of unified Niger Delta ethnic groups would be a 
disaster scenario that would invariably cause a negative impact to the Nigerian economy 
to such a degree, that the disintegration of Nigeria might well be possible. 
C. CONCLUSION 
An examination of the ethnic insurgencies in Aceh and the Niger Delta reveals 
that the ethnic composition of the communities is a critical variable that influenced the 
trajectory of those ethnically-derived movements. As has been shown, ethnic composition 
is both highly malleable and determinative of the options available to insurgent groups. 
The malleability of ethnicity as shown in these insurgencies means that insurgents have 
the ability to change their options based upon how ethnic entrepreneurs manipulate ethnic 
markers and historical narratives. Skillful manipulation of these components of ethnic 
identity enable insurgent leaders to potentially open their options for gaining popular 
support and directing their insurgent efforts. Where ethnic barriers can be reduced, 
resulting in a homogeneous effect, separatism becomes an option that places the 
insurgent group in a much better position to leverage greater access to resources.  
An analysis of the government responses by Indonesia and Nigeria reveals that 
while the ethnic composition of an insurgency may indeed be a determinant of whether a 
government will have the option of avoiding a counter-insurgency campaign, the 
government’s actions both before and during the conduct of that campaign will 
potentially influence the manner in which ethnicity remains a mobilizing agent for the 
insurgent leaders. In both cases, it has been shown that military actions absent political 
and economic reforms will invariably lead to greater ethnic cohesion within the ethnically 
delimited communities. This was empirically observed in Aceh while hypothetically 
outlined for the Niger Delta.  
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In situations where grievances derive from communities that are ethnically 
homogeneous and cohesive, the government faces the potential of a separatist threat that 
can likely only be eliminated by an integrated counter-insurgency consisting of political, 
economic, and military actions. Failure to implement these political and economic 
concessions in the face of military actions alone will invariably lead to the hardening of 
ethnic cohesion and sentiments against the government, culminating in a strengthening of 
ethnic nationalism and greater degree of support for the insurgent movement.  
Where grievances emanate from communities that are divided and ethnically 
heterogeneous, counter-insurgency can be avoided through efforts to criminalize the 
movement, thereby making it difficult for the movement to maintain legitimacy and 
receive universal popular support within the area it is operating. However, this tactic can 
only be used as a temporary measure. Though the insurgent groups may be marginalized, 
the ethnic communities will still remain under economic pressure thereby opening the 
potential for shared hardship to derive new ethnic identities. Unless active steps are taken 
by the state to keep ethnic divisions active, the coalescing of a new ethnic identity under 
the guise of government neglect and marginalization is possible. Once this occurs, the 
government will have no other options than those of a state facing an ethnically unified 
threat capable of pushing for secession: a coordinated counter-insurgency that seeks to 
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